Ep82 - The Flinto Case returns to Eni's AGM

In the previous episode, I showed that, on April 19, 2021, 120 days after the amicable settlement proposal was submitted, I wrote again to Eni’s Board of Directors.

My question was simple:

🔹 Had the Board received the proposal?

🔹And, if so, when could we discuss the possibility of bringing to an end a story that would turn 20 years old that year?

I received no direct response.

A few weeks later, however, the Flinto Case would return to one of the company’s most important institutional forums.

📌 May 12, 2021.

At Eni’s Annual General Meeting, Mauro Meggiolaro, acting as a critical shareholder and representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, officially submitted three questions on my behalf.

It was the fourth time the Flinto Case had reached Eni’s AGM - after 2017, 2018 and 2020.

This time, the subject was clearly identified in the company’s official document:

🔹 "Amicable Settlement Proposal Submitted by Douglas Linares Flinto”.

The AGM document itself recorded the context.

On December 18, 2020, my lawyer had sent Eni’s lawyer a “Proposal for Amicable Settlement”.

And the text submitted to the AGM contained a fundamental piece of information:

🔹 the proposal had been submitted “as requested by Eni”.

It also recorded that, after 120 days without being contacted by the company, I had written again to the Board on April 19, 2021, asking whether the proposal had been received and when it would be possible to discuss a resolution of the case.

Then came the three questions.

QUESTION 1
Why did Eni ask Douglas Linares Flinto for a “Proposal for Amicable Settlement”?

QUESTION 2
If, in an attempt to reach an amicable settlement, the party requesting a proposal may accept it or respond with a counterproposal, why had Eni still not contacted me after receiving my proposal?

QUESTION 3
When did Eni plan to respond to my amicable settlement proposal?

Three questions.

📌 All concerning a proposal that, according to the document submitted to the AGM itself, had been sent at Eni’s request.

But there was an even larger question behind them.

After almost 20 years, I was still seeking what I had repeatedly requested from the beginning:

🔴 that the facts, the documents and the different versions presented regarding my dismissal be effectively examined.

The 2021 AGM offered Eni another opportunity to publicly explain its position.

How did the company answer the three questions?

That is what we will see in the next episode.

Tomorrow:

📌 THREE QUESTIONS. ONE MORE ANSWER.

After 25 years, my request remains the same:

🔴 that Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the Flinto Case - examining the facts, the documents and the different versions presented by the company itself over the years.

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Questions and Answers before Eni’s 2021 AGM

Ep81 - 120 days... No answer!

In the previous episode, I showed that, on December 18, 2020, a proposal for an amicable settlement of the Flinto Case was formally submitted.

€5.5 million.

But the amount was only part of a much broader document.

The proposal reconstructed almost twenty years of the Flinto Case and incorporated new internal documents produced by Agip Brasil and the Italian Agip/Eni structure, held by Petrobras after it acquired Agip Brasil’s assets and obtained by me under Brazil’s Access to Information Law.

The documents were on the table.

So was the proposal.

Then the waiting began.

📌 April 19, 2021.

Exactly 120 days had passed since the proposal was submitted.

I was still waiting for an answer.

So I wrote directly to the then-Chairwoman of Eni’s Board, copying the other Board members, including CEO Claudio Descalzi.

I began by recalling that 120 days had passed since the proposal was submitted.

The email also recorded that the proposal had been submitted to Eni’s external lawyer after the then-Italian Ambassador to Brazil, Francesco Azzarello, had informed me that Eni was waiting for an amicable settlement proposal.

My purpose was simple.

I wanted to know two things:

🔹 Had Eni’s Board received my proposal?

And:

🔹When could we discuss bringing the Flinto Case to an end?

This is exactly what I wrote:

📌 “The purpose of this e-mail is to confirm whether the Board of Eni has received my Proposal for Amicable Settlement, and also to find out when we can discuss the possibility of putting an end on this story that, in August 2021, will complete 20 long years.”

I was not submitting a new complaint or presenting a new proposal.

I was asking whether the Board had received the proposal submitted 120 days earlier - and when we could discuss it.

There was another significant coincidence.

Exactly one year earlier, on Apr 19, 2020, I had written to Lucia Calvosa when she had been nominated to become Chairwoman of Eni’s new Board.

I presented the Flinto Case and provided documents so that the new corporate governance could know my version of the facts before reaching its own conclusion.

Now, on Apr 19, 2021, I was returning to the same Board.

A year had passed.

The proposal had been submitted.

The new documents were available.

And the Flinto Case was approaching its 20th anniversary.

But the central question remained:

🔴 Why not submit the Flinto Case - the facts, the documents and the different versions presented regarding my dismissal - to a truly independent investigation?

A few weeks later, the Flinto Case would once again reach Eni’s Annual General Meeting.

🔹 For the fourth time.

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

📌 NEXT EPISODE: THE FLINTO CASE RETURNS TO ENI’S AGM. FOR THE FOURTH TIME.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Email to Eni’s Board - Apr19, 2021

Ep80 - The €5.5 million settlement proposal

In the previous episode, I explained how, in November 2020, Italian diplomacy entered the Flinto Case.

After the Italian Embassy in Brazil contacted Eni, then-Ambassador Francesco Azzarello told me that Eni was waiting for a proposal for an amicable settlement.

A few weeks later, that proposal would be submitted.

But first, something important happened.

📌 November 26, 2020.

I received from Petrobras documents obtained under Brazil’s Access to Information Law, following determinations by Brazil’s Office of the Comptroller General - CGU.

Petrobras had acquired Agip Brasil’s assets in 2004 and held documents from Eni’s former Brazilian subsidiary.

Among them were four records produced by Agip Brasil and the Italian Agip/Eni structure in 2001 and 2002:

🔹 1. The Internal Audit Report dated July 26, 2001, produced after my whistleblowing report and only six days before my dismissal.

🔹 2. A fax dated October 3, 2002, sent by Agip Petroli in Italy to the President of Agip Brasil, forwarding my complaint to Eni’s Board and requesting further investigation.

🔹 3. A memorandum dated October 7, 2002, signed by two Agip Brasil executives, presenting the “circumstances” of my dismissal in response to inquiries from Italy.

🔹 4. A memorandum dated February 7, 2002, produced by the then-head of Internal Audit only six days after I appealed to the company’s Ethics Committee.

These documents were extremely significant.

They allowed me to compare the company’s internal records with the “three versions” presented over the years regarding my dismissal - including information published in Eni’s official "Questions and Answers before the 2017 Shareholders’ Meeting".

Then came:

📌 December 18, 2020.

Four days after my 57th birthday and exactly one week before Christmas, my lawyer formally submitted to Eni a proposal for an amicable settlement.

The document stated that the case first needed to be reconstructed in light of the “new and important documentation” I had obtained.

It reconstructed the Flinto Case chronologically, beginning with the events of 2001 and drawing on dozens of documents, witness statements and other evidence.

At the end came the financial proposal:

€5.5 MILLION.

After almost twenty years, this was an opportunity to examine the dispute in light of evidence that now included internal records I did not possess when everything began.

But something was more important than the amount:

The documents were on the table.

And the same question remained:

🔴 Why not submit the Flinto Case - the facts, the documents and the different versions presented regarding my dismissal - to a truly independent investigation?

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

📌 NEXT EPISODE: 120 DAYS. NO ANSWER.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Amicable Settlement Proposal:
🔹 Original DOC
🔹 English

Ep79 - Eni was waiting for a settlement proposal

In the previous episode, I showed how Italian diplomacy entered the Flinto Case.

After my message was forwarded to the head of the Italian Foreign Ministry, his then Chief of Staff, Ettore Sequi, referred the Flinto Case to the Italian Embassy in Brazil.

On November 10, 2020, Carlo Jacobucci, Economic Counsellor in Brazil, wrote on behalf of the then Ambassador Francesco Azzarello:

🔹 “We will contact Eni regarding the matter and, as soon as we receive a response, we will contact you”.

The Embassy therefore informed me that it would contact Eni.

Just over two weeks later, something happened.

📌 November 26, 2020.

I spoke with Ambassador Francesco Azzarello.

During that conversation, he informed me that he could not take the Flinto Case to the Italian Prime Minister, as doing so was outside the scope of his role.

But there was something else.

And it could change the course of this story.

According to what Ambassador Azzarello told me following the Embassy’s contact with the company:

🔴 Eni was waiting for a proposal for an amicable settlement.

After almost two decades of conflict, that information had a special significance for me.

🔹 In 2015, following the first decision of the Civil Court of Rome, my lawyers had already sought an amicable settlement.

🔹 In 2018, during Eni’s Annual General Meeting, critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, had publicly offered to mediate an attempt to resolve the dispute between the parties.

The meeting never took place.

🔹 In 2020, a court-referred mediation in Rome had also ended without an agreement.

But now there was a new element:

🔹 according to the information conveyed to me by the Italian Ambassador to Brazil, Eni was waiting for an amicable settlement proposal.

I decided to submit one.

📌 December 18, 2020.

Through my Italian lawyer, a proposal would be formally submitted.

And then a new wait would begin.

25 years later, my request remains the same:

🔴 That Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the Flinto Case, examining the facts, the documents, and the different versions of my dismissal presented by the company itself over all these years.

I am not asking anyone to believe me. I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

📌 NEXT EPISODE:

THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Correspondence with the Italian Embassy in Brazil (November 2020):
🔹 Original in Portuguese
🔹 English Translation

2️⃣ Memorial — The Flinto Case

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep78 - When Italian diplomacy entered my case

In the previous episode, I showed that, following the lack of response from Eni’s new Board of Directors, on July 16, 2020, I took the Flinto Case to the NCP Brazil because of what I considered clear instances of the company’s non-compliance with the OECD - OCDE Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

A few months later, another institutional path opened.

This time, through Italian diplomacy.

📌 November 9, 2020.

Following contacts with the then Italian Foreign Minister, the Chief of Staff at the
Farnesina, Italian diplomat Ettore Sequi, referred my case to Italy’s highest-ranking representative in my country, the Italian Ambassador to Brazil, Francesco Azzarello, so that I could discuss my case involving Eni.

That same day, I wrote to the Ambassador.

The following day, I received a response from Carlo Jacobucci, Counsellor and Head of the Commercial Department at the Italian Embassy in Brazil, sent on behalf of Ambassador Azzarello:

🔹 “We will contact Eni regarding the matter and, as soon as we receive a response, we will contact you”.

That was important.

🔴 The Italian Embassy in Brazil would contact Eni about the Flinto Case.

I replied to Jacobucci asking only that Ambassador Azzarello also have the opportunity to hear my side of the story:

📌 “I would like Ambassador Azzarello to have the opportunity to hear my version of the facts involving Eni, just as he will hear the Italian oil giant’s version.”

The documents record this sequence of messages between November 9 and 10, 2020.

Just over two weeks later, I would finally speak with Ambassador Francesco Azzarello.

📌 November 26, 2020.

During that conversation, Ambassador Azzarello informed me that he could not take the Flinto Case to the Italian Prime Minister because doing so was outside the scope of his institutional role.

But I would receive another piece of information - one that opened a new possibility in this story:

🔹 an amicable settlement.

25 years later, my request remains the same:

🔴 That Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the Flinto Case, examining the facts, the documents, and the different versions of my dismissal presented by the company itself over all these years.

I am not asking anyone to believe me. I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

📌 NEXT EPISODE:

ENI WAS WAITING FOR A SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Correspondence with the Italian Embassy in Brazil (November 2020)
🔹 Original in Portuguese
🔹 English Translation

2️⃣ Memorial — The Flinto Case

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep77 - Taking the Flinto Case to the OECD

In the previous episode, I showed that, in May 2020, a newly composed Board of Directors took over Eni’s governance.

That same month, for the fourth time, I took the Flinto Case directly to the company’s governance.

I submitted documents and asked the new Board to have my case investigated and analyzed.

My request was clear:

🔴 Investigate.

Examine the documents.

Compare the different versions.

Establish the facts.

And reach an independent conclusion.

I received no response from the new Board of Directors.

Faced with that silence, I decided to turn to an external institution.

📌 July 16, 2020.

I took the Flinto Case to the Brazilian National Contact Point for the OECD - OCDE Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (NCP Brazil).

It marked an important shift in this story.

For almost two decades, I had tried to obtain answers from within Eni itself - through executives, different Boards of Directors, internal oversight bodies, and Shareholders’ Meetings.

Now, I was taking the conflict beyond the company’s walls.

I filed a complaint with the NCP Brazil concerning Eni’s conduct in relation to the Flinto Case:

🔹 I submitted documents.

🔹 I reconstructed the chronology of events.

🔹 I reported my original whistleblowing disclosure in 2001, my dismissal, and the events that followed.

🔹 And I brought before an institutional mechanism linked to the OECD - OCDE Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises a story that, at that point, was approaching its 20th anniversary.

For me, there was one fundamental question:

🔴 If Eni was not willing to conduct an independent investigation into the Flinto Case, could an external institution finally examine the facts and the documents?

I did not yet know what the answer would be.

But on July 16, 2020, a new chapter was beginning.

The Flinto Case had reached the NCP Brazil.

And just a few months later, another institutional path would open.

This time, through Italian diplomacy.

25 years later, however, my request remains essentially the same:

🔴 That Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the Flinto Case, examining the facts, the documents, and the different versions of my dismissal presented by the company itself over these 25 years.

I am not asking anyone to believe me. I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

📌 NEXT EPISODE:

WHEN ITALIAN DIPLOMACY ENTERED THE FLINTO CASE.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Complaint submitted to the NCP Brazil (July 16, 2020)
🔹 Original document
🔹 English version

2️⃣ Supplement Complaint submitted to the NCP Brazil (July 20, 2020)
🔹 Original document
🔹 English version

3️⃣ Memorial — The Flinto Case

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events 

Ep76 - A new Board. The same request: investigate!

In the previous episode, I showed that the mediation related to Eni’s second lawsuit against me ended without an agreement.

But a new opportunity seemed to be emerging.

📌 2020. A new Eni Board of Directors.

At the Annual General Meeting in May of that year, a newly composed Board took over the company’s governance.

There was a new Chairwoman, Lucia Calvosa.

CEO Claudio Descalzi remained in office.

The new Board was composed of: Lucia Calvosa, Claudio Descalzi, Ada Lucia De Cesaris, Filippo Giansante, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Emanuele Piccinno, Nathalie Tocci e Raphael Vermeir CBE.

For me, however, the fundamental question was different:

🔴 Would a new governance be willing to do what I had been asking for nearly two decades?

🔹 Investigate.

Not simply accept my version.

Not simply accept the versions presented by the company itself.

But conduct a truly independent investigation, examining the facts, the documents and the different versions concerning my dismissal.

That is what I asked the new Board of Directors once again.

I submitted documents and asked the new governance to conduct an independent review of the Flinto Case - a due diligence of the facts and documents accumulated since 2001.

My request was simple:

🔹 Examine the documents.

🔹 Compare the different versions.

🔹 Establish the facts.

🔹 And reach an independent conclusion.

After almost 20 years, I was not asking the new Board to believe me.

I was asking it to investigate.

And that remains the essence of the ENI’S WAY — 25 YEARS OF TRUTH campaign.

🔴 25 years later, my request remains the same: that Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the facts and documents of the Flinto Case.

I am not asking you to believe me. I am asking you to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

But would the new Board respond to this request?

The answer - or the absence of one - would lead me to seek a new institution outside Eni.

📌 NEXT EPISODE:

TAKING THE FLINTO CASE TO THE OECD - OCDE.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Message to Eni’s new Board of Directors (2020)

2️⃣ Memorial - The Flinto Case

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep75 - The Court-referred mediation

In the previous episode, I showed that, at Eni’s Annual General Meeting in May 2020, 13 questions concerning the Flinto Case were submitted to the company.
One of them asked:

🔹 Would Eni participate in the mediation related to the second lawsuit filed against me?

There was a reason for that question.

📌 October 29, 2019. Rome.

During a hearing in the second lawsuit, the judge recorded that the mediation procedure had not been initiated and referred the parties to mediation.

📌 July 3, 2020. Rome.

The mediation finally took place before the Rome Mediation Body.

The official record of that meeting expressly identifies the procedure as:

🔴 COURT-REFERRED MEDIATION.

I was represented by my Italian lawyer.

🔹 No agreement was reached, and the mediation ended without a settlement between the parties.

This was not the first attempt at mediation.

In 2018, during Eni’s Annual General Meeting, critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, had offered to mediate a meeting between Eni and me.

That meeting never took place.

In 2020, the circumstances were different.

This time, the mediation took place after the parties had been referred to it by the judge.

And it ended without an agreement.

But my fundamental request was - and remains - much simpler:

🔴 That Eni allow a truly independent investigation into the Flinto Case, examining the facts, the documents, and the different versions of my dismissal presented by the company itself over these 25 years.

I am not asking anyone to believe me. I am asking them to examine the documents before reaching an independent conclusion.

And another opportunity for that would arise.

Eni had just begun a new governance cycle.

A new Board of Directors. The same request: investigate.

📌 NEXT EPISODE:

A NEW BOARD. THE SAME REQUEST: INVESTIGATE.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Mediation Record (July 3, 2020)
🔹 Original document
🔹 English translation

2️⃣ Memorial (1999-2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

 

Ep74 - Eni's AGM 2020: 13 questions... One Answer!

In the previous episode, I showed that, on April 19, 2020, I wrote directly to Lucia Calvosa, then nominated to become Chairwoman of Eni’s Board of Directors.

I presented the Flinto Case, provided documents and pointed to questions that remained unanswered.

A few weeks later, the case would once again reach Eni’s Annual General Meeting.

📌 May 13, 2020.

For the third time, critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, through Fondazione Finanza Etica, brought my case to Eni’s AGM.

Eni’s official document included a specific section:

🔹 “Section III on behalf of the whistle-blower Douglas Linares Flinto.”

And 13 questions were submitted.

Among them:

🔹 What facts, evidence and documents supported Eni’s version of my dismissal?

🔹 Why did Eni state at the 2017 AGM that my case had been published in the “Eni 2002 Financial Statements” if, according to my challenge, there was no reference to me in that document?

🔹 Would Eni participate in a meeting with me, mediated by Fondazione Finanza Etica?

🔹 Would Eni participate in the mediation within the second lawsuit?

🔹 Where were the documents exchanged between Eni headquarters and Agip Brazil concerning my case?

🔹 Would Eni conduct an independent investigation into the Flinto Case?

And finally:

🔴 If an independent investigation found mistakes by Agip Brazil — and Eni itself — would the company acknowledge them so that, after 19 years, I could restore my reputation?

13 questions.

What was Eni’s answer?

🔴 “Answer to questions 1.1 to 1.13”

Eni stated that the case was the subject of pending disputes and therefore:

“Eni does not consider this to be the place to deal with them and further discuss them, since they are already under the attention of the judiciary.”

No individual answers.

No indication of where my case appeared in the Eni 2002 Financial Statements.

No answer about the documents, mediation or an independent investigation.

📌 Eni chose not to address the substance of the 13 questions.

And this raises an inevitable question:

If, in 2017, Eni’s AGM was considered an appropriate place for the company to present its version of the Flinto Case, why, in 2020, was the same AGM no longer considered an appropriate place to answer questions challenging that version with documentary evidence?

In 2017, Eni presented its version.

In 2020, when confronted with questions and documents, it referred the matter to the judiciary.

Yet the Italian judiciary itself had opened another path:

🔹 mediation.

📌 July 1, 2020.

That will be another document in this story, which I will present next Monday.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ AGM 2020 - Questions and Answers

2️⃣ Memorial (1999-2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep73 - 2020: A new Chairwoman. But...

In 2020, before Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM), I once again attempted to bring the Flinto Case to the attention of the company’s corporate governance.

The Italian media began reporting the names of those who would make up Eni’s new Board of Directors, which would be formally appointed at the AGM in May.

Among them was lawyer and university professor Lucia Calvosa (Università di Pisa), nominated by the Italian government - the largest shareholder of the Italian oil giant - to become Chairwoman of the company.

For me, a new composition of the Board also meant a new opportunity:

📌 to present the documents to people who had not been directly involved in the previous events.

So, on April 19, 2020, I sent a message directly to Lucia Calvosa.

The subject of the email was:

🔹 “Eni's Chairwoman x Eni's Whistleblower”

At the very beginning, I wrote:

🔹 “I need you to know my Ethical Clash with Eni”.

And I explained that my message and the attached documents would allow her to learn about my documented version of the events before hearing the version presented by the company’s executives.

It was not an isolated message.

📎 The email included four attached documents, including a detailed account of the facts and documents related to the Shareholders’ Meetings and the questions I had been raising with the company.

Over three pages, I reconstructed the main events since 2001.

🔹 I spoke about my whistleblowing report.

🔹 I spoke about the book “Eni: Lo Stato parallelo”.

🔹 I spoke about the questions presented at the 2017 AGM.

🔹 I spoke about the mediation proposal made by Mauro Meggiolaro at the 2018 AGM.

🔹 I spoke about Eni’s lawsuit and the decision of the Rome Court of Appeal.

And I ended that long message with an extraordinarily simple question:

🔴 “Please, can you help me?”

After almost two decades, I was not asking a new Chairwoman simply to believe my version of the story.

🔹 I was providing documents.

🔹 I was pointing to court decisions.

🔹 I was highlighting questions that remained unanswered.

🔹 And I was giving Eni’s new leadership an opportunity to examine the Flinto Case before reaching its own conclusion.

A few weeks later, Lucia Calvosa would become Chairwoman of Eni’s Board of Directors.

And the Flinto Case would once again reach the company’s Annual General Meeting.

For the third time!

That will be the next part of this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Email sent to Lucia Calvosa (April 19, 2020)

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep72 - 2019: The Court-referred mediation

Yesterday, I showed what happened on October 16, 2019.

The Rome Court of Appeal rejected Eni’s appeal in the first lawsuit brought against me and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

🔹 First instance: lawsuit rejected.

🔹 Second instance: Eni’s appeal rejected.

Just 13 days later, something particularly significant happened.

📌 October 29, 2019.

The word “mediation” reappeared in the history of the Flinto Case.

But this time, it was not during a Shareholders’ Meeting.

It was within the Italian judicial system itself.

On that day, a hearing was held before Judge Antonella Di Tullio of the Ordinary Court of Rome, in the context of the second lawsuit brought against me.

Represented in the proceedings were Eni S.p.A., Marco Petracchini (then-Chief Audit Officer), Massimo Mantovani (then-Chief Legal Officer), Douglas Linares Flinto, and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics.

The Judge then recorded:

🔹 “Having noted that mediation proceedings had not been initiated, the Judge invites the parties to proceed with mediation”.

The hearing was adjourned to June 23, 2020.

For the second time in less than two years, therefore, a concrete opportunity emerged to bring the parties to the mediation table.

The first had arisen on May 10, 2018, during Eni’s Annual General Meeting.

Critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, publicly offered to mediate the conflict.

The meeting never took place due to a lack of interest from the Italian oil giant.

Now it was different.

📌 The possibility of mediation was emerging within the judicial proceedings themselves.

After years of letters, complaints and lawsuits, there was once again an opportunity to try another path:

🔹 Bring the parties face to face.

🔹 Bring the different versions face to face.

🔹 Bring the documents face to face.

And this time, there is another document.

A document recording what happened when the mediation proceedings actually reached the Organismo di Mediazione Forense di Roma - the Rome Bar Association Mediation Body.

📌 July 1, 2020.

The document expressly states:

🔴 “DELEGATA DAL GIUDICE” — “COURT-REFERRED MEDIATION”.

What happened during that mediation?

Was there a willingness to discuss the Flinto Case and seek a solution?

That will be another document in this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Minutes of the hearing before the Ordinary Court of Rome (Oct 29, 2019):
🔹 original
🔹 English

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep71 - Eni appealed. The Court rejected it!

Yesterday, I showed that, in May 2018, an alternative to judicial confrontation was publicly proposed during Eni’s Annual General Meeting:🔹 Mediation, proposed by critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica.

The meeting never took place due to a lack of interest from the Italian oil giant.

So, the legal dispute continued.

📌 October 16, 2019.

The Rome Court of Appeal ruled on Eni’s appeal in the first lawsuit brought against me and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics.

Five years earlier, the Civil Court of Rome had rejected Eni’s lawsuit, in which the company initially sought €15 million in damages.

Eni appealed and reduced its claim to €5 million - coincidentally, the same amount as the unsuccessful 2015 proposal for an amicable settlement.

The Court recorded:

🔹 “The appellant now reduces its claim for damages to an amount equal to one-third of that originally sought...”

One-third of the original amount.

But the central issue remained:

🔹 “...however, the failure to allege consequential damage persists.”

In other words, Eni still failed to demonstrate the concrete consequences of the damage it claimed to have suffered.

The Court went further.

Eni had not provided evidence demonstrating that its institutional interlocutors had actually become aware of the communications and that its image had consequently suffered appreciable harm.

Nor had Eni alleged that any business deal or commercial relationship had been prevented or even hindered.

The conclusion was clear:

📌 “For these reasons, the appeal must be rejected”.

And in the operative part:

🔹 “The appeal is rejected”.

The Rome Court of Appeal rejected Enzo Di Giulio’s appeal.

Eni was also ordered to reimburse €10,000 in legal costs, plus the charges specified in the judgment.

Thus:

🔹 First instance: lawsuit rejected.

🔹 Second instance: Eni’s appeal rejected.

This does not mean that the Italian courts declared my allegations against Eni to be true.

That is not what the Court decided.

What the documents show is specific: Eni sought €15 million - later reduced to €5 million - but failed to demonstrate the concrete consequences of the alleged damage as required by the Italian courts.

This raises an inevitable question:

🔴 What was the nature of a €15 million lawsuit against a whistleblower and an organization dedicated to Business Ethics when the alleged damage could not be demonstrated?

A SLAPP - Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation?

Just one week later, mediation would reappear in this story - this time within the Italian judicial system itself.

That will be the next document in this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Rome Court of Appeal Judgment (Oct 16, 2019):
🔹 original
🔹 English

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep70 - A public proposal for mediation

Last week, we reached September 2017, when Eni initiated a second legal action against me, while the first was still under appeal.

A few months later, an alternative to judicial confrontation emerged.

📌 A public proposal for mediation.

On May 10, 2018, during Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM), critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, once again brought the Flinto Case to the company’s attention.

But this time, he did not submit questions before the AGM.

He proposed a concrete solution at the microphone, before the members of Eni’s Board, including Chairwoman Emma Marcegaglia and CEO Claudio Descalzi:

🔹 “...we wanted to offer ourselves as mediators between Douglas Linares Flinto and the company, in an attempt to resolve this conflict”.

The proposal was recorded in the official minutes of Eni’s 2018 Annual General Meeting.

Meggiolaro added another statement that I consider particularly significant:

🔹 “...we can instead talk about concrete facts, we would be happy to do so”.

Talking about concrete facts.

That is exactly what I have been asking for over the past 25 years.

Not for anyone simply to believe my version.

Examine the facts. Examine the documents.

In 2018, therefore, an alternative was publicly placed on the table.

It was not another complaint.

It was not another lawsuit.

It was dialogue.

A third party was offering to bring Eni and Douglas Linares Flinto together to examine the facts and try to resolve a conflict that had already lasted for years.

And all of this happened inside Eni’s own Annual General Meeting.

Mediation could have brought deeply conflicting documents and versions of the Flinto Case face to face.

However, the mediation meeting proposed by the critical shareholder never took place.

The following year, another decisive event would occur.

📌 October 16, 2019.

The Rome Court of Appeal would rule on the appeal in the first lawsuit brought by Eni against me and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

That will be the next document in this story.

❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Minutes of Eni’s 2018 Annual General Meeting 

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep69 - What does Eni's Way seek?

After 25 years, my request remains simple: an independent examination of the facts and the body of evidence.

Since 2001, I have brought the Flinto Case to the attention of different levels of Eni’s management and corporate governance.

Over this period, five Boards of Directors and three CEOs have led the company.

Documents were submitted. Correspondence was sent. Evidence was presented. Court proceedings took place in Brazil and Italy. Institutional bodies were approached.

Yet, after 25 years, what I seek remains essentially the same:

That Eni submit the facts and the body of evidence surrounding the Flinto Case to a genuinely independent, transparent and impartial examination.

I am not asking Eni to accept my version of events in advance.

Nor am I asking that a conclusion be determined before the evidence is examined.

I am asking for something more fundamental:

That the entire body of evidence be examined.

That the documents be cross-examined against one another.

That the different versions of events be compared with the existing records.

That the evidence be assessed in its proper context.

And that the conclusions follow from that examination.

The central question

After 25 years, one question remains:

Why not submit the entire body of evidence to a truly independent examination?

An independent examination should not be feared by either side.

If the documents support Eni’s position, they will speak for themselves.

If they point to different conclusions, those conclusions should also be addressed.

Throughout Eni’s Way, I have never asked readers to simply accept my version of this story.

Instead, I have asked them to examine the documentary record:

Read the documents.
Follow the timeline.
Examine the evidence.
Draw your own conclusions.

I ask Eni to apply the same principle to the Flinto Case.

After 25 years, my request is not for a predetermined outcome. It is not for my version of events to be accepted without scrutiny.

It is for the entire body of evidence to be independently examined — wherever that examination may lead.

I am not asking for a predetermined conclusion.
I am asking for an independent examination.

Ep68 - 2017: A second lawsuit against me

Yesterday, I showed a documentary discrepancy I consider particularly serious.

At the 2017 AGM, Eni stated that conclusions regarding the Flinto Case had been recorded by the Collegio Sindacale in Eni’s 2002 Annual Report.

I went looking for them.

The information cited by Eni was not there.

But 2017 had another important chapter in this story.

The first lawsuit filed by Eni against me and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics had already been decided at first instance.

In September 2014, the Court of Rome found the action unfounded.

Eni appealed.

While the appeal was pending, I continued publishing documents and information about the Flinto Case on social media and Eni’s Way.

Then, in September 2017, came:

🔹 a second lawsuit against me.

This time, there was an important difference.

Alongside Eni, two of its executives took part in the action:

📌 Marco Petracchini and Massimo Mantovani.

There is important context.

Before the lawsuit, I had filed complaints involving these executives with international professional bodies related, respectively, to audit and legal functions.

The new action again challenged my publications about the Flinto Case, alleging they were defamatory and slanderous.

There was another significant detail.

In the first lawsuit, Eni had sought €15 million in damages.

The Court of Rome found the action unfounded.

In the second lawsuit, the plaintiffs did not specify the amount of damages, leaving any quantification to the Court.

But perhaps the most revealing documentary aspect lies in the material brought into the proceedings.

Eni’s Way publications were used in the lawsuit.

In other words, what I published to make my version of events and related documents public became part of the judicial action brought against me.

Consider the sequence:

🔹 2014: Eni’s first lawsuit is found unfounded by the Court of Rome.

🔹 2017: ten questions about the Flinto Case reach the AGM.

🔹 2017: Eni presents a new version of my dismissal and attributes its basis to the 2002 Annual Report.

🔹 September 2017: a second lawsuit is initiated against me.

I am not asking anyone to accept my interpretation.

I am asking people to examine the documents and the dates.

And one question will remain relevant throughout the next episodes:

📌 when someone continues reporting and publishing information about what they consider wrongdoing, where does a company’s legitimate right to defend itself end - and where might retaliation against a whistleblower begin?

The second lawsuit would continue through the Italian courts.

Its consequences would take years to unfold.

Next week, we will continue this chronology.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Second lawsuit - case documentation

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep67 - The document wasn't there

Yesterday, I showed the 10 questions about the Flinto Case submitted by critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro before Eni’s 2017 AGM.

Eni did not answer them individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response - and presented a new version of the reasons for my dismissal.

According to Eni:

🔹 “[...] l’ex dipendente è stato licenziato, unitamente agli autori dei comportamenti illeciti, per reticenza, per aver violato l’obbligo della riservatezza e per il tentativo di utilizzare strumentalmente il Codice di Comportamento del Gruppo Eni per ottenere vantaggi personali dalla Società”

In other words, Eni stated that I had been dismissed, together with those responsible for the irregularities, for reticence, breach of confidentiality and attempting to use the Code of Conduct to obtain personal advantages from the company.

An extremely serious accusation.

But there was something even more important.

Eni cited an official source to support this narrative.

According to the company, the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale di Eni SpA in:

📌 Eni’s 2002 Annual Report.

Eni was therefore directing its shareholders to an official company document from 2002.

There was only one problem.

Eni’s 2002 Annual Report was not available on its website.

After an extensive internet search, I found it.

354 pages.

But I was looking for something specific.

I wanted to verify what Eni had told its shareholders.

Eni indicated where to find it:

🔹 the Collegio Sindacale Report.

I searched for the allegation that I had been dismissed for reticence, breach of confidentiality or attempting to obtain personal advantages through the Code of Conduct.

I did not find it.

Across the 354 pages of Eni’s 2002 Annual Report, there is not a single reference to Douglas Linares Flinto or the Flinto Case - much less to the conclusion Eni claimed in 2017 was recorded there.

So we have two official documents from the same company:

📌 AGM 2017: Eni stated that conclusions regarding my case had been recorded by the Collegio Sindacale in the 2002 Annual Report.

📌 ENI 2002 ANNUAL REPORT: that information is not there.

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

Both documents will be available.

Read Eni’s response.

Open the 2002 Annual Report.

Search.

And draw your own conclusion.

That is the principle behind this campaign:

🔴 the documents must speak for themselves.

A few months later, in September 2017, Eni initiated a new lawsuit against me.

And there is an important detail:

Eni attached Eni’s Way publications to its initial court filing.

Tomorrow, I will tell that story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2017 AGM Questions & Answers

2️⃣ Eni 2002 Annual Report

3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep66 - 2017: Ten questions. No individual answers!

In Apr 2017, my case reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the first time, under the leadership of Chair Emma Marcegaglia and CEO Claudio Descalzi.

Italian journalist and critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, included 10 questions about the Flinto Case among those formally submitted to the company before the AGM.

They were objective questions.

Among them:

1️⃣ Does Eni encourage its employees to report fraud, corruption and misconduct?

2️⃣ What should happen when an employee suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing?

3️⃣ Which of the different versions presented by Eni regarding my dismissal was true?

In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary had stated that my departure resulted from an “administrative and organizational restructuring”.

Later, Eni maintained that I had been dismissed because I failed to cooperate with an internal investigation and had adopted a “reticent” attitude.

Which version was true?

The questions continued:

4️⃣ If an internal investigation really took place in Brazil, why did Eni not present its findings as evidence in the lawsuit filed against me in Rome?

5️⃣ What did the Brazilian court decision cited by the company actually say in full?

6️⃣ If I was the person who reported the irregularities, how could I simultaneously have refused to cooperate and adopted a “reticent” attitude during the investigation?

7️⃣ Why did Eni never respond to the communications I sent to the Boards of Directors under Vittorio Mincato, Paolo Scaroni and Claudio Descalzi?

And further:

8️⃣ Why did Eni decide to sue me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics?

9️⃣ After the Rome Court found the lawsuit unfounded, why did the Board of Directors not instruct Internal Audit to investigate the Flinto Case?

🔟 Finally: what did Eni intend to do to correct the situation?

And here is the central point.

Eni did not answer the ten questions individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response.

First, Eni stated that whistleblowing is an essential element of its Internal Control and Risk Management System and that its procedures should ensure that whistleblowers are not subjected to any form of retaliation.

Then it turned to me.

And it was in this response that Eni presented a new and extremely serious version of the reasons for my dismissal.

More than that:

📌 to lend credibility to this version, the company stated that the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale in “Eni’s 2002 Annual Report”.

There was only one problem.

“Eni’s 2002 Annual Report” was not available on Eni’s corporate website.

But after an extensive search on the internet, I found this official company document.

And I went looking for what the company said had been published there.

Tomorrow, I will show what I found.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Questions and Answers before the 2017 AGM: https://shre.ink/GeON

Ep65 - From retaliation to a mission

Yesterday, while sharing what andrea greco and Giuseppe Oddo wrote about the Flinto Case in "Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo", I mentioned a consequence that would change my professional life.

Today, I want to tell that story.

In August 2003, two years after my dismissal from Agip do Brasil, I founded the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

What I experienced at the Brazilian subsidiary of the Italian oil giant was the trigger - the spark that led to the Institute’s creation.

I had reported irregularities internally, following the Code of Ethics I received when I joined Agip.

Weeks later, I was dismissed.

As documented throughout this series, I consider that dismissal retaliation for my report.

But from that experience emerged a conviction:

🔹 it was not enough to defend Ethics when problems occurred. We needed to build a culture in which doing the right thing was a permanent value.

That conviction gave birth to the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

Its mission:

📌 “To promote Ethics in corporate and educational environments with the support of companies that share the principles and values of Ethics”

Its vision:

📌 “To be a reference in promoting Ethics, improving the way business is conducted in Brazil and inspiring students to do the right thing”

Why companies and students?

Because companies do not have lives of their own.

People bring them to life.

People make decisions, report misconduct, decide whether to investigate - and choose between what is convenient and what is right.

That is why the Institute also works with a very special audience:

🔹 university students - the leaders of tomorrow’s companies.

And something fills us with pride:

📌 the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics is the only institution in the country that promotes Business Ethics among university students.

We believe there is no acceptable way to do business other than through Ethics.

That is why we say:

DO NOT SURRENDER TO DISHONESTY.

DO NOT GIVE IN TO MISCONDUCT.

BECOME A SLAVE TO ETHICS.

WITH INTEGRITY, WE BUILD AN UNASSAILABLE CHARACTER

AND FOLLOW A PATH TO SUCCESS.

WHEN MANY CHOOSE WHAT IS WRONG, ETHICS WHISPERS: 

DO THE RIGHT THING!

Looking back, what I consider one of the greatest injustices of my professional life produced something I never planned.

A dismissal ended my career at Agip.

Two years later, that experience helped create an institution dedicated to Business Ethics.

This August, the Institute celebrated 23 years.

And the story that began inside Agip/Eni continued.

In 2017, it reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Rome.

A critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro submitted ten questions about the Flinto Case to the Board.

Tomorrow, I will show those questions - and how Eni decided to respond.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios

Ep64 - They examined the documents

In Mar 2016, after nearly five years of investigation, Italian journalists andrea greco and Giuseppe Oddo published Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo.

Among the stories selected was one from Brazil.

Mine.

The Flinto Case was the only Brazilian story published in the book.

I have discussed Lo Stato Parallelo before. Today, I want to show what the journalists actually wrote about my case.

The chapter begins with Brazil, Petrobras and Saipem. Then, referring to the Code of Ethics, the authors make a striking transition:

🔹 its application, they wrote, can become a “boomerang” and even lead to dismissal.

They then introduce my story.

The book recounts that, in 2001, as an AGIP Brasil executive in Cuiabá, I received detailed reports of irregularities involving my direct superior and other employees.

After verifying the reports through documents and conversations with operators, I acted based on the Code of Ethics I had received when joining Agip.

Weeks later, I was dismissed.

The authors record that my superiors initially cited a breakdown of the relationship of trust. After I appealed to the Ethics Committee, the company gave another explanation: administrative and organizational restructuring.

The book also reports my communication to Eni’s Board, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli’s trip to Brazil, subsequent dismissals and AGIP Brasil’s sale to Petrobras in 2004.

It records my continued contacts with Eni’s shareholders and other stakeholders and the legal action Eni brought against me in 2010.

In 2014, the Court found the action unfounded.

The chapter ends with my position: I had become a victim of my own whistleblowing; my career had been destroyed, but I did not regret that ethical battle and would continue fighting to restore my name, honor and reputation.

Months later, I asked Greco why they had included my story.

His answer was significant:

🔴 “We decided to include your story because, after reading most of the documents you sent us and speaking with our sources, we became convinced that your story was solid, and that it was right and interesting to include it in the context of Lo Stato Parallelo”

Two Italian investigative journalists had examined the documents, consulted their own sources and decided to include the Flinto Case in an investigation into Eni.

That is the principle behind this campaign:

🔹 I am not asking anyone simply to believe me.

📌 I am asking them to examine the documents.

And this story had another consequence.

What I experienced after my whistleblowing and dismissal contributed to a decision that would change my professional life.

In 2003, the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics was founded.

Tomorrow, I will tell that story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Book presentation

2️⃣ Chapter of the Flinto Case

3️⃣ E-mail Greco

4️⃣ Memorial (1999 - 2025)

5️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep63 - 2014: Eni’s Way goes public

In recent posts, I showed what happened before the Italian courts.

But alongside the legal dispute, one question remained:

📌 who within Eni would be willing to independently examine the documents I had been presenting for so many years?

I had already tried different paths.

In 2002, I took my case to the highest levels of governance - under CEO Vittorio Mincato.

In 2009, I presented the facts and documents again - under CEO Paolo Scaroni.

And in 2014, with a new Board of Directors, I tried once more.

A new Chairwoman: Emma Marcegaglia.

A new CEO: Claudio Descalzi.

A new Board: Andrea Gemma, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Alessandro Lorenzi, Moriani Diva, Fabrizio Pagani and Luigi Zingales.

For me, this was another opportunity for the facts to finally be examined.

But once again, that did not happen.

Three moments: 2002. 2009. 2014.

Three attempts to reach Eni’s governance.

It was then, still in 2014, that I made a decision that would change my strategy:

🔹 if the documents could not find room for an effective review within the company, I would take them to the public.

I decided to take the Flinto Case public.

And I created the "Eni’s Way" social media channels.

The name was not chosen by chance.

When I was an executive at Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary, "Eni’s Way" was the name of a global corporate publication.

One of its covers, which I still have, featured Enrico Mattei, accompanied by the headline:

🔹 “Il secolo di Mattei - The Century of Mattei”.

Years later, the publication was discontinued.

But the name remained in my memory.

In 2014, I brought it back for an entirely different purpose.

🔴 If “Eni’s Way” had once presented Eni to the world from the company’s own perspective, it would now present documents and events that were also part of my history with Eni.

And so, the "Eni’s Way" social media channels were born.

Not to ask people to believe my version.

But to do something more objective:

🔹 make the documents public.

Letters. Emails. Reports. Court decisions. Correspondence with governance bodies.

And a chronology allowing anyone interested to reconstruct the events and form their own opinion.

For years, I had insisted that Eni itself examine my case internally.

After the attempts in 2002, 2009 and again in 2014, I decided this story needed to move beyond the company’s walls.

That is how an old name from Eni’s corporate communications took on a new meaning.

🔷 ENI’S WAY.

The name remained.

Who told the story changed.

From that moment on, the dispute would no longer remain confined to internal channels and the courts.

The documents would begin to speak directly to the public.

And that decision would have consequences.

On Monday, I will continue from this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep62 - Eni: from €15 million to €5 million

Yesterday, I showed that, following the judgment of September 29, 2014, there were contacts between the lawyers representing the parties in Italy.

Those discussions culminated, on January 20, 2015, in my lawyer formally submitting a request for €5 million as compensation for the damages I claimed to have suffered over those years.

There appeared to be an opportunity to finally bring an end to a dispute that had already lasted more than a decade.

But an amicable settlement was not reached.

Eni decided to continue the legal battle.

The company appealed the judgment of the Civil Court of Rome that had rejected its claim against me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

But something changed on appeal.

And that detail deserves attention.

In the original lawsuit, Eni had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.

The Court rejected the claim, referring critically to the way the damages had been quantified at the substantial sum of €15 million.

Then, on appeal, Eni reduced its damages claim from €15 million to €5 million.

A reduction of €10 million - two-thirds of the amount originally claimed.

Coincidence or not, there was a particularly curious fact in that sequence.

Shortly before, during the discussions that followed the judgment, my lawyer had formally submitted to Eni a request for €5 million for the professional, financial, moral and reputational damages I claimed to have suffered.

Now, on appeal, €5 million had also become the amount Eni was seeking against me and the Institute.

I have no documentary evidence that allows me to state that there was a connection between these two amounts.

But the chronological and financial coincidence exists - and it is part of the reconstruction of events:

🔹 Eni claimed €15 million.

🔹 The Civil Court of Rome declared the claim unfounded and rejected the lawsuit.

🔹 There was an attempt to reach a settlement between the parties.

🔹 No settlement was reached.

🔹 Eni appealed - and reduced its claim to €5 million.

The case, therefore, did not end.

It continued for several more years before the Italian courts.

And on October 16, 2019, the Rome Court of Appeal would rule on that dispute.

But before we reach that point, there is another part of this story that needs to be told.

After so many years of trying to bring the documents to the company’s internal channels and different levels of governance, the dispute was beginning to move definitively beyond the corporate walls.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Civil Court of Rome Judgment:
🔹 original in Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Fax from Micali to D’Ercole:
🔹 original in Italian
🔹 English

3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events