In Apr 2017, my case reached
Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the first time, under the leadership of Chair Emma Marcegaglia and CEO
Claudio Descalzi.
Italian journalist and critical shareholder
Mauro Meggiolaro,
representing
Fondazione Finanza Etica,
included 10 questions about the Flinto Case among those formally submitted to the company before the AGM.
They were objective questions.
Among them:
1️⃣ Does
Eni
encourage its employees to report fraud, corruption and misconduct?
2️⃣ What should happen when an employee suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing?
3️⃣ Which of the different versions presented by
Eni
regarding my dismissal was true?
In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary had stated that my departure resulted from an “administrative and organizational restructuring”.
Later,
Eni
maintained that I had been dismissed because I failed to cooperate with an internal investigation and had adopted a “reticent” attitude.
Which version was true?
The questions continued:
4️⃣ If an internal investigation really took place in Brazil, why did
Eni
not present its findings as evidence in the lawsuit filed against me in Rome?
5️⃣ What did the Brazilian court decision cited by the company actually say in full?
6️⃣ If I was the person who reported the irregularities, how could I simultaneously have refused to cooperate and adopted a “reticent” attitude during the investigation?
7️⃣ Why did
Eni
never respond to the communications I sent to the Boards of Directors under Vittorio Mincato,
Paolo Scaroni
and
Claudio Descalzi?
And further:
8️⃣ Why did
Eni
decide to sue me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics?
9️⃣ After the Rome Court found the lawsuit unfounded, why did the Board of Directors not instruct Internal Audit to investigate the Flinto Case?
๐ Finally: what did
Eni
intend to do to correct the situation?
And here is the central point.
Eni
did not answer the ten questions individually.
Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response.
First,
Eni
stated that whistleblowing is an essential element of its Internal Control and Risk Management System and that its procedures should ensure that whistleblowers are not subjected to any form of retaliation.
Then it turned to me.
And it was in this response that
Eni
presented a new and extremely serious version of the reasons for my dismissal.
More than that:
๐ to lend credibility to this version, the company stated that the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale in “Eni’s 2002 Annual Report”.
There was only one problem.
“Eni’s 2002 Annual Report” was not available on
Eni’s corporate website.
But after an extensive search on the internet, I found this official company document.
And I went looking for what the company said had been published there.
Tomorrow, I will show what I found.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Questions and Answers before the 2017 AGM:
https://shre.ink/GeON
Wednesday, September 09, 2026
Ep66 - 2017: Ten questions. No individual answers!
Labels:
Business Ethics,
Code of Ethics,
compliance,
Corporate Governance,
Due Diligence,
Eni,
Eni SpA,
Ethicability,
Ethics,
Integrity,
principles,
Responsible Business Conduct,
values,
Whistleblower,
Whistleblowing
Tuesday, September 08, 2026
Ep65 - From retaliation to a mission
Today, I want to tell that story.
In August 2003, two years after my dismissal from Agip do Brasil, I founded the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.
What I experienced at the Brazilian subsidiary of the Italian oil giant was the trigger - the spark that led to the Institute’s creation.
I had reported irregularities internally, following the Code of Ethics I received when I joined Agip.
Weeks later, I was dismissed.
As documented throughout this series, I consider that dismissal retaliation for my report.
But from that experience emerged a conviction:
๐น it was not enough to defend Ethics when problems occurred. We needed to build a culture in which doing the right thing was a permanent value.
That conviction gave birth to the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.
Its mission:
๐ “To promote Ethics in corporate and educational environments with the support of companies that share the principles and values of Ethics”
Its vision:
๐ “To be a reference in promoting Ethics, improving the way business is conducted in Brazil and inspiring students to do the right thing”
Why companies and students?
Because companies do not have lives of their own.
People bring them to life.
People make decisions, report misconduct, decide whether to investigate - and choose between what is convenient and what is right.
That is why the Institute also works with a very special audience:
๐น university students - the leaders of tomorrow’s companies.
And something fills us with pride:
๐ the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics is the only institution in the country that promotes Business Ethics among university students.
We believe there is no acceptable way to do business other than through Ethics.
That is why we say:
DO NOT SURRENDER TO DISHONESTY.
DO NOT GIVE IN TO MISCONDUCT.
BECOME A SLAVE TO ETHICS.
WITH INTEGRITY, WE BUILD AN UNASSAILABLE CHARACTER
AND FOLLOW A PATH TO SUCCESS.
WHEN MANY CHOOSE WHAT IS WRONG, ETHICS WHISPERS:
DO THE RIGHT THING!
Looking back, what I consider one of the greatest injustices of my professional life produced something I never planned.
A dismissal ended my career at Agip.
Two years later, that experience helped create an institution dedicated to Business Ethics.
This August, the Institute celebrated 23 years.
And the story that began inside Agip/Eni continued.
In 2017, it reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Rome.
A critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro submitted ten questions about the Flinto Case to the Board.
Tomorrow, I will show those questions - and how Eni decided to respond.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Instituto Brasileiro de รtica nos Negรณcios
Labels:
Business Ethics,
Code of Ethics,
compliance,
Corporate Governance,
Due Diligence,
Eni,
Eni SpA,
Ethicability,
Ethics,
Integrity,
principles,
Responsible Business Conduct,
values,
Whistleblower,
Whistleblowing
Monday, September 07, 2026
Ep64 - They examined the documents
In Mar 2016, after nearly five years of investigation, Italian journalists
andrea greco
and
Giuseppe Oddo
published
Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo.
Among the stories selected was one from Brazil.
Mine.
The Flinto Case was the only Brazilian story published in the book.
I have discussed Lo Stato Parallelo before. Today, I want to show what the journalists actually wrote about my case.
The chapter begins with Brazil, Petrobras and Saipem. Then, referring to the Code of Ethics, the authors make a striking transition:
๐น its application, they wrote, can become a “boomerang” and even lead to dismissal.
They then introduce my story.
The book recounts that, in 2001, as an AGIP Brasil executive in Cuiabรก, I received detailed reports of irregularities involving my direct superior and other employees.
After verifying the reports through documents and conversations with operators, I acted based on the Code of Ethics I had received when joining Agip.
Weeks later, I was dismissed.
The authors record that my superiors initially cited a breakdown of the relationship of trust. After I appealed to the Ethics Committee, the company gave another explanation: administrative and organizational restructuring.
The book also reports my communication to Eni’s Board, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli’s trip to Brazil, subsequent dismissals and AGIP Brasil’s sale to Petrobras in 2004.
It records my continued contacts with Eni’s shareholders and other stakeholders and the legal action Eni brought against me in 2010.
In 2014, the Court found the action unfounded.
The chapter ends with my position: I had become a victim of my own whistleblowing; my career had been destroyed, but I did not regret that ethical battle and would continue fighting to restore my name, honor and reputation.
Months later, I asked Greco why they had included my story.
His answer was significant:
๐ด “We decided to include your story because, after reading most of the documents you sent us and speaking with our sources, we became convinced that your story was solid, and that it was right and interesting to include it in the context of Lo Stato Parallelo”
Two Italian investigative journalists had examined the documents, consulted their own sources and decided to include the Flinto Case in an investigation into Eni.
That is the principle behind this campaign:
๐น I am not asking anyone simply to believe me.
๐ I am asking them to examine the documents.
And this story had another consequence.
What I experienced after my whistleblowing and dismissal contributed to a decision that would change my professional life.
In 2003, the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics was founded.
Tomorrow, I will tell that story.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Book presentation
2️⃣ Chapter of the Flinto Case
3️⃣ E-mail Greco
4️⃣ Memorial (1999 - 2025)
5️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events
Among the stories selected was one from Brazil.
Mine.
The Flinto Case was the only Brazilian story published in the book.
I have discussed Lo Stato Parallelo before. Today, I want to show what the journalists actually wrote about my case.
The chapter begins with Brazil, Petrobras and Saipem. Then, referring to the Code of Ethics, the authors make a striking transition:
๐น its application, they wrote, can become a “boomerang” and even lead to dismissal.
They then introduce my story.
The book recounts that, in 2001, as an AGIP Brasil executive in Cuiabรก, I received detailed reports of irregularities involving my direct superior and other employees.
After verifying the reports through documents and conversations with operators, I acted based on the Code of Ethics I had received when joining Agip.
Weeks later, I was dismissed.
The authors record that my superiors initially cited a breakdown of the relationship of trust. After I appealed to the Ethics Committee, the company gave another explanation: administrative and organizational restructuring.
The book also reports my communication to Eni’s Board, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli’s trip to Brazil, subsequent dismissals and AGIP Brasil’s sale to Petrobras in 2004.
It records my continued contacts with Eni’s shareholders and other stakeholders and the legal action Eni brought against me in 2010.
In 2014, the Court found the action unfounded.
The chapter ends with my position: I had become a victim of my own whistleblowing; my career had been destroyed, but I did not regret that ethical battle and would continue fighting to restore my name, honor and reputation.
Months later, I asked Greco why they had included my story.
His answer was significant:
๐ด “We decided to include your story because, after reading most of the documents you sent us and speaking with our sources, we became convinced that your story was solid, and that it was right and interesting to include it in the context of Lo Stato Parallelo”
Two Italian investigative journalists had examined the documents, consulted their own sources and decided to include the Flinto Case in an investigation into Eni.
That is the principle behind this campaign:
๐น I am not asking anyone simply to believe me.
๐ I am asking them to examine the documents.
And this story had another consequence.
What I experienced after my whistleblowing and dismissal contributed to a decision that would change my professional life.
In 2003, the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics was founded.
Tomorrow, I will tell that story.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Book presentation
2️⃣ Chapter of the Flinto Case
3️⃣ E-mail Greco
4️⃣ Memorial (1999 - 2025)
5️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events
Labels:
Business Ethics,
Code of Ethics,
compliance,
Corporate Governance,
Due Diligence,
Eni,
Eni SpA,
Ethicability,
Ethics,
Integrity,
principles,
Responsible Business Conduct,
values,
Whistleblower,
Whistleblowing
Friday, September 04, 2026
Ep63 - 2014: Eni’s Way goes public
In recent posts, I showed what happened before the Italian courts.
But alongside the legal dispute, one question remained:
๐ who within Eni would be willing to independently examine the documents I had been presenting for so many years?
I had already tried different paths.
In 2002, I took my case to the highest levels of governance - under CEO Vittorio Mincato.
In 2009, I presented the facts and documents again - under CEO Paolo Scaroni.
And in 2014, with a new Board of Directors, I tried once more.
A new Chairwoman: Emma Marcegaglia.
A new CEO: Claudio Descalzi.
A new Board: Andrea Gemma, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Alessandro Lorenzi, Moriani Diva, Fabrizio Pagani and Luigi Zingales.
For me, this was another opportunity for the facts to finally be examined.
But once again, that did not happen.
Three moments: 2002. 2009. 2014.
Three attempts to reach Eni’s governance.
It was then, still in 2014, that I made a decision that would change my strategy:
๐น if the documents could not find room for an effective review within the company, I would take them to the public.
I decided to take the Flinto Case public.
And I created the "Eni’s Way" social media channels.
The name was not chosen by chance.
When I was an executive at Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary, "Eni’s Way" was the name of a global corporate publication.
One of its covers, which I still have, featured Enrico Mattei, accompanied by the headline:
๐น “Il secolo di Mattei - The Century of Mattei”.
Years later, the publication was discontinued.
But the name remained in my memory.
In 2014, I brought it back for an entirely different purpose.
๐ด If “Eni’s Way” had once presented Eni to the world from the company’s own perspective, it would now present documents and events that were also part of my history with Eni.
And so, the "Eni’s Way" social media channels were born.
Not to ask people to believe my version.
But to do something more objective:
๐น make the documents public.
Letters. Emails. Reports. Court decisions. Correspondence with governance bodies.
And a chronology allowing anyone interested to reconstruct the events and form their own opinion.
For years, I had insisted that Eni itself examine my case internally.
After the attempts in 2002, 2009 and again in 2014, I decided this story needed to move beyond the company’s walls.
That is how an old name from Eni’s corporate communications took on a new meaning.
๐ท ENI’S WAY.
The name remained.
Who told the story changed.
From that moment on, the dispute would no longer remain confined to internal channels and the courts.
The documents would begin to speak directly to the public.
And that decision would have consequences.
On Monday, I will continue from this point.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)
2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events
Labels:
Business Ethics,
Code of Ethics,
compliance,
Corporate Governance,
Due Diligence,
Eni,
Eni SpA,
Ethicability,
Ethics,
Integrity,
principles,
Responsible Business Conduct,
values,
Whistleblower,
Whistleblowing
Thursday, September 03, 2026
Ep62 - Eni: from €15 million to €5 million
Yesterday, I showed that, following the judgment of September 29, 2014, there were contacts between the lawyers representing the parties in Italy.
Those discussions culminated, on January 20, 2015, in my lawyer formally submitting a request for €5 million as compensation for the damages I claimed to have suffered over those years.
There appeared to be an opportunity to finally bring an end to a dispute that had already lasted more than a decade.
But an amicable settlement was not reached.
Eni decided to continue the legal battle.
The company appealed the judgment of the Civil Court of Rome that had rejected its claim against me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de รtica nos Negรณcios).
But something changed on appeal.
And that detail deserves attention.
In the original lawsuit, Eni had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.
The Court rejected the claim, referring critically to the way the damages had been quantified at the substantial sum of €15 million.
Then, on appeal, Eni reduced its damages claim from €15 million to €5 million.
A reduction of €10 million - two-thirds of the amount originally claimed.
Coincidence or not, there was a particularly curious fact in that sequence.
Shortly before, during the discussions that followed the judgment, my lawyer had formally submitted to Eni a request for €5 million for the professional, financial, moral and reputational damages I claimed to have suffered.
Now, on appeal, €5 million had also become the amount Eni was seeking against me and the Institute.
I have no documentary evidence that allows me to state that there was a connection between these two amounts.
But the chronological and financial coincidence exists - and it is part of the reconstruction of events:
๐น Eni claimed €15 million.
๐น The Civil Court of Rome declared the claim unfounded and rejected the lawsuit.
๐น There was an attempt to reach a settlement between the parties.
๐น No settlement was reached.
๐น Eni appealed - and reduced its claim to €5 million.
The case, therefore, did not end.
It continued for several more years before the Italian courts.
And on October 16, 2019, the Rome Court of Appeal would rule on that dispute.
But before we reach that point, there is another part of this story that needs to be told.
After so many years of trying to bring the documents to the company’s internal channels and different levels of governance, the dispute was beginning to move definitively beyond the corporate walls.
Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.
❎ Learn more:
1️⃣ Civil Court of Rome Judgment:
๐น original in Italian
๐น English
2️⃣ Fax from Micali to D’Ercole:
๐น original in Italian
๐น English
3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)
Labels:
Business Ethics,
Code of Ethics,
compliance,
Corporate Governance,
Due Diligence,
Eni,
Eni SpA,
Ethicability,
Ethics,
Integrity,
principles,
Responsible Business Conduct,
values,
Whistleblower,
Whistleblowing
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