Ep69 - What does Eni's Way seek?

After 25 years, my request remains simple: an independent examination of the facts and the body of evidence.

Since 2001, I have brought the Flinto Case to the attention of different levels of Eni’s management and corporate governance.

Over this period, five Boards of Directors and three CEOs have led the company.

Documents were submitted. Correspondence was sent. Evidence was presented. Court proceedings took place in Brazil and Italy. Institutional bodies were approached.

Yet, after 25 years, what I seek remains essentially the same:

That Eni submit the facts and the body of evidence surrounding the Flinto Case to a genuinely independent, transparent and impartial examination.

I am not asking Eni to accept my version of events in advance.

Nor am I asking that a conclusion be determined before the evidence is examined.

I am asking for something more fundamental:

That the entire body of evidence be examined.

That the documents be cross-examined against one another.

That the different versions of events be compared with the existing records.

That the evidence be assessed in its proper context.

And that the conclusions follow from that examination.

The central question

After 25 years, one question remains:

Why not submit the entire body of evidence to a truly independent examination?

An independent examination should not be feared by either side.

If the documents support Eni’s position, they will speak for themselves.

If they point to different conclusions, those conclusions should also be addressed.

Throughout Eni’s Way, I have never asked readers to simply accept my version of this story.

Instead, I have asked them to examine the documentary record:

Read the documents.
Follow the timeline.
Examine the evidence.
Draw your own conclusions.

I ask Eni to apply the same principle to the Flinto Case.

After 25 years, my request is not for a predetermined outcome. It is not for my version of events to be accepted without scrutiny.

It is for the entire body of evidence to be independently examined — wherever that examination may lead.

I am not asking for a predetermined conclusion.
I am asking for an independent examination.

Ep68 - 2017: A second lawsuit against me

Yesterday, I showed a documentary discrepancy I consider particularly serious.

At the 2017 AGM, Eni stated that conclusions regarding the Flinto Case had been recorded by the Collegio Sindacale in Eni’s 2002 Annual Report.

I went looking for them.

The information cited by Eni was not there.

But 2017 had another important chapter in this story.

The first lawsuit filed by Eni against me and the Brazilian Institute of Business Ethics had already been decided at first instance.

In September 2014, the Court of Rome found the action unfounded.

Eni appealed.

While the appeal was pending, I continued publishing documents and information about the Flinto Case on social media and Eni’s Way.

Then, in September 2017, came:

🔹 a second lawsuit against me.

This time, there was an important difference.

Alongside Eni, two of its executives took part in the action:

📌 Marco Petracchini and Massimo Mantovani.

There is important context.

Before the lawsuit, I had filed complaints involving these executives with international professional bodies related, respectively, to audit and legal functions.

The new action again challenged my publications about the Flinto Case, alleging they were defamatory and slanderous.

There was another significant detail.

In the first lawsuit, Eni had sought €15 million in damages.

The Court of Rome found the action unfounded.

In the second lawsuit, the plaintiffs did not specify the amount of damages, leaving any quantification to the Court.

But perhaps the most revealing documentary aspect lies in the material brought into the proceedings.

Eni’s Way publications were used in the lawsuit.

In other words, what I published to make my version of events and related documents public became part of the judicial action brought against me.

Consider the sequence:

🔹 2014: Eni’s first lawsuit is found unfounded by the Court of Rome.

🔹 2017: ten questions about the Flinto Case reach the AGM.

🔹 2017: Eni presents a new version of my dismissal and attributes its basis to the 2002 Annual Report.

🔹 September 2017: a second lawsuit is initiated against me.

I am not asking anyone to accept my interpretation.

I am asking people to examine the documents and the dates.

And one question will remain relevant throughout the next episodes:

📌 when someone continues reporting and publishing information about what they consider wrongdoing, where does a company’s legitimate right to defend itself end - and where might retaliation against a whistleblower begin?

The second lawsuit would continue through the Italian courts.

Its consequences would take years to unfold.

Next week, we will continue this chronology.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Second lawsuit - case documentation

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep67 - The document wasn't there

Yesterday, I showed the 10 questions about the Flinto Case submitted by critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro before Eni’s 2017 AGM.

Eni did not answer them individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response - and presented a new version of the reasons for my dismissal.

According to Eni:

🔹 “[...] l’ex dipendente è stato licenziato, unitamente agli autori dei comportamenti illeciti, per reticenza, per aver violato l’obbligo della riservatezza e per il tentativo di utilizzare strumentalmente il Codice di Comportamento del Gruppo Eni per ottenere vantaggi personali dalla Società”

In other words, Eni stated that I had been dismissed, together with those responsible for the irregularities, for reticence, breach of confidentiality and attempting to use the Code of Conduct to obtain personal advantages from the company.

An extremely serious accusation.

But there was something even more important.

Eni cited an official source to support this narrative.

According to the company, the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale di Eni SpA in:

📌 Eni’s 2002 Annual Report.

Eni was therefore directing its shareholders to an official company document from 2002.

There was only one problem.

Eni’s 2002 Annual Report was not available on its website.

After an extensive internet search, I found it.

354 pages.

But I was looking for something specific.

I wanted to verify what Eni had told its shareholders.

Eni indicated where to find it:

🔹 the Collegio Sindacale Report.

I searched for the allegation that I had been dismissed for reticence, breach of confidentiality or attempting to obtain personal advantages through the Code of Conduct.

I did not find it.

Across the 354 pages of Eni’s 2002 Annual Report, there is not a single reference to Douglas Linares Flinto or the Flinto Case - much less to the conclusion Eni claimed in 2017 was recorded there.

So we have two official documents from the same company:

📌 AGM 2017: Eni stated that conclusions regarding my case had been recorded by the Collegio Sindacale in the 2002 Annual Report.

📌 ENI 2002 ANNUAL REPORT: that information is not there.

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

Both documents will be available.

Read Eni’s response.

Open the 2002 Annual Report.

Search.

And draw your own conclusion.

That is the principle behind this campaign:

🔴 the documents must speak for themselves.

A few months later, in September 2017, Eni initiated a new lawsuit against me.

And there is an important detail:

Eni attached Eni’s Way publications to its initial court filing.

Tomorrow, I will tell that story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2017 AGM Questions & Answers

2️⃣ Eni 2002 Annual Report

3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep66 - 2017: Ten questions. No individual answers!

In Apr 2017, my case reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the first time, under the leadership of Chair Emma Marcegaglia and CEO Claudio Descalzi.

Italian journalist and critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, included 10 questions about the Flinto Case among those formally submitted to the company before the AGM.

They were objective questions.

Among them:

1️⃣ Does Eni encourage its employees to report fraud, corruption and misconduct?

2️⃣ What should happen when an employee suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing?

3️⃣ Which of the different versions presented by Eni regarding my dismissal was true?

In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary had stated that my departure resulted from an “administrative and organizational restructuring”.

Later, Eni maintained that I had been dismissed because I failed to cooperate with an internal investigation and had adopted a “reticent” attitude.

Which version was true?

The questions continued:

4️⃣ If an internal investigation really took place in Brazil, why did Eni not present its findings as evidence in the lawsuit filed against me in Rome?

5️⃣ What did the Brazilian court decision cited by the company actually say in full?

6️⃣ If I was the person who reported the irregularities, how could I simultaneously have refused to cooperate and adopted a “reticent” attitude during the investigation?

7️⃣ Why did Eni never respond to the communications I sent to the Boards of Directors under Vittorio Mincato, Paolo Scaroni and Claudio Descalzi?

And further:

8️⃣ Why did Eni decide to sue me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics?

9️⃣ After the Rome Court found the lawsuit unfounded, why did the Board of Directors not instruct Internal Audit to investigate the Flinto Case?

🔟 Finally: what did Eni intend to do to correct the situation?

And here is the central point.

Eni did not answer the ten questions individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response.

First, Eni stated that whistleblowing is an essential element of its Internal Control and Risk Management System and that its procedures should ensure that whistleblowers are not subjected to any form of retaliation.

Then it turned to me.

And it was in this response that Eni presented a new and extremely serious version of the reasons for my dismissal.

More than that:

📌 to lend credibility to this version, the company stated that the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale in “Eni’s 2002 Annual Report”.

There was only one problem.

“Eni’s 2002 Annual Report” was not available on Eni’s corporate website.

But after an extensive search on the internet, I found this official company document.

And I went looking for what the company said had been published there.

Tomorrow, I will show what I found.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Questions and Answers before the 2017 AGM: https://shre.ink/GeON

Ep65 - From retaliation to a mission

Yesterday, while sharing what andrea greco and Giuseppe Oddo wrote about the Flinto Case in "Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo", I mentioned a consequence that would change my professional life.

Today, I want to tell that story.

In August 2003, two years after my dismissal from Agip do Brasil, I founded the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

What I experienced at the Brazilian subsidiary of the Italian oil giant was the trigger - the spark that led to the Institute’s creation.

I had reported irregularities internally, following the Code of Ethics I received when I joined Agip.

Weeks later, I was dismissed.

As documented throughout this series, I consider that dismissal retaliation for my report.

But from that experience emerged a conviction:

🔹 it was not enough to defend Ethics when problems occurred. We needed to build a culture in which doing the right thing was a permanent value.

That conviction gave birth to the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

Its mission:

📌 “To promote Ethics in corporate and educational environments with the support of companies that share the principles and values of Ethics”

Its vision:

📌 “To be a reference in promoting Ethics, improving the way business is conducted in Brazil and inspiring students to do the right thing”

Why companies and students?

Because companies do not have lives of their own.

People bring them to life.

People make decisions, report misconduct, decide whether to investigate - and choose between what is convenient and what is right.

That is why the Institute also works with a very special audience:

🔹 university students - the leaders of tomorrow’s companies.

And something fills us with pride:

📌 the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics is the only institution in the country that promotes Business Ethics among university students.

We believe there is no acceptable way to do business other than through Ethics.

That is why we say:

DO NOT SURRENDER TO DISHONESTY.

DO NOT GIVE IN TO MISCONDUCT.

BECOME A SLAVE TO ETHICS.

WITH INTEGRITY, WE BUILD AN UNASSAILABLE CHARACTER

AND FOLLOW A PATH TO SUCCESS.

WHEN MANY CHOOSE WHAT IS WRONG, ETHICS WHISPERS: 

DO THE RIGHT THING!

Looking back, what I consider one of the greatest injustices of my professional life produced something I never planned.

A dismissal ended my career at Agip.

Two years later, that experience helped create an institution dedicated to Business Ethics.

This August, the Institute celebrated 23 years.

And the story that began inside Agip/Eni continued.

In 2017, it reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Rome.

A critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro submitted ten questions about the Flinto Case to the Board.

Tomorrow, I will show those questions - and how Eni decided to respond.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios