Ep59 - 2014: A new Eni Board. But...

In May 2014, a new chapter began in Eni’s governance.

The company had a new Chairwoman, Emma Marcegaglia, a new CEO, Claudio Descalzi, and a newly appointed Board of Directors.

For me, that change represented a new opportunity.

By then, I had already made several attempts to bring my case to the company’s highest levels.

I had written to AGIP Brazil’s leadership (2001), the Ethics Committee (2002), and Eni’s Board of Directors in Rome (2002).

In 2009, following another change in governance, I sent a ten-page MEMORIAL to then-CEO Paolo Scaroni, copying Chairman Roberto Poli, members of the Board, the Board of Statutory Auditors and other governance bodies.

My intention was always the same:

📌 to give Eni the opportunity to examine the documents and reach its own conclusions.

In 2014, once again, there was a new leadership that had not been involved in the events of 2001.

So I decided to try once more.

On April 15, 2014, even before the new governance was formally confirmed, I wrote to Emma Marcegaglia, briefly presenting my story and asking that my case be examined.

After the new leadership was confirmed, on May 9, I wrote again.

The subject line said exactly:

🔷 “Guardians of Ethics at Eni SpA”.

The message was addressed to Emma Marcegaglia, with copies to Claudio Descalzi and members of Eni’s new governance, including Andrea Gemma, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Alessandro Lorenzi, Moriani Diva, Fabrizio Pagani and Luigi Zingales, as well as members of the company’s oversight bodies.

In that message, I expressed a conviction I still hold today:

🔴 members of the Board should also act as “Guardians of Ethics”, respecting not only the letter but also the spirit of the company’s Code of Ethics.

I also sent the Memorial concerning my case, in English.

I was not asking them to accept my version of events.

The documents existed.

AGIP’s internal audit existed.

The witness statements existed.

My communications to the company since 2001 existed.

And the events that followed my reports also existed.

What I expected was simple

🔹 to examine the documents;

🔹 to determine what had actually happened;

🔹 and to reach an independent conclusion.

Changes in leadership can provide an opportunity to revisit past decisions through new eyes.

But another important element was unfolding.

While I was once again trying to be heard by Eni, a lawsuit brought against me by the company itself was approaching a decisive moment in Italy.

On September 29, 2014, the Italian Court would issue its ruling.

That decision would add another document to the story I am reconstructing in this series.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Email “Guardians of Ethics at Eni SpA” (May 9, 2014 — original in English)

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events
 

Ep58 - Whistleblowing should not end in punishment

Yesterday, I showed a document that, years after my dismissal, recorded something I had been unable to explain.

According to a statement by a ROYAL FIC executive, a version was circulating in the job market claiming that I had been involved in the fraud and acts of corruption at AGIP do Brasil.

Not the employee who had reported the irregularities.

But someone allegedly involved in them.

I also made clear what I cannot prove:

📌 I have no document showing who created this narrative, who spread it, or how far it circulated.

But I can show what happened afterward.

My executive career practically ended.

And there is a particularly painful contrast.

In 2004, Petrobras acquired assets from AGIP Brasil.

All my former colleagues who remained with the company - those who were not dismissed when Eni acted at its Brazilian subsidiary - were incorporated into Petrobras and were able to continue their careers at Brazil’s state-controlled oil company.

I did not have that opportunity.

And there is an important detail: regular entry into Petrobras requires a public competitive examination.

The acquisition gave those employees an exceptional opportunity for professional continuity.

Had I not been dismissed in 2001, would I have followed the same path?

I cannot prove what did not happen.

But I lost the possibility of having that opportunity.

That is what I consider a “loss of a chance”.

The consequences went further.

Unable to rebuild my executive career, I faced financial and economic difficulties.

Without regular professional income, I also became unable to maintain regular contributions to INSS - Brazil’s public Social Security system.

Decades later, this affected:

🔹 my retirement benefits.

This story, therefore, has never been only about a dismissal in 2001.

It is about what can happen after a professional reports irregularities and his reputation is called into question.

A professional decision can take only minutes.

Its consequences can last for decades.

That is why modern whistleblowing systems should not merely receive reports.

They must protect those who report in good faith against retaliation and professional harm.

After twenty-five years, I continue to ask the Italian oil giant Eni for something at the heart of Corporate Governance best practices:

📌 that the documents be examined together and independently.

My report.

My dismissal.

The subsequent investigations.

The different versions of my dismissal.

The information that, according to a notarized statement, circulated in the job market.

And the consequences.

Only an independent, impartial and transparent review of the entire body of evidence can answer the question that has followed this story since 2001:

🔴 what really happened after I decided to follow the Code of Ethics and report the irregularities?


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Memorial 1999–2025

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep57 - What does the market say about me?

Yesterday, I showed a 2010 court document in which Eni presented a new explanation for my dismissal from AGIP do Brasil.

But one question had remained unanswered for years:

📌 Why was I unable to rebuild my executive career?

I had experience, professional results and extensive knowledge of the fuel industry.

Yet after my dismissal, my career changed dramatically.

Then a particularly important document emerged.

An executive from Royal FIC, where I worked from Aug 2002 to Feb 2003, put in writing what, according to him, was circulating in the job market:

🔷 “The job market claims that Douglas Linares Flinto was dismissed from Agip Brasil because of his involvement in the internal fraud and acts of corruption that occurred in 2001 within the Regional Sales Management in Cuiabá”.

Read that again.

According to that statement, the market was not saying that I had reported the irregularities.

It was saying that I had been involved in them.

Yet Royal FIC hired me because, according to the same document, it believed my account:

📌 that I was the whistleblower who reported the facts in accordance with the company’s Code of Ethics.

The executive added that while he worked with me, “there was never anything that discredited me”.

That document changed my understanding of what might have happened to my career.

There was now a written record that an extremely damaging version about me was circulating in the job market.

Who created this narrative?

Who spread it?

How far did it circulate?

I do not have a document that allows me to answer those questions definitively.

I do not present as fact what I cannot prove.

But one thing can be documented:

🔹 the statement records that this information was circulating in the job market.

And that raises an unavoidable question:

🔴 What realistic chance does an executive have to rebuild his career when the market associates him with the very fraud and corruption he says he reported?

In Brazil, the informal circulation of information intended to prevent workers from finding new employment is often described as “blacklisting”.

Brazilian Labor Courts have addressed allegations involving this type of practice.

Almost ten years later, a possible explanation was emerging for what had profoundly changed my professional life.

But the consequences went further.

They include what I consider the “loss of a chance” at Petrobras, as well as the effects on my assets, Social Security contributions and, years later, my retirement benefits.

That is what I will show tomorrow.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Statement by the Royal FIC executive:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ VEJA article on “blacklisting” in the Brazilian job market:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

3️⃣ Brazilian Superior Labor Court (TST) decisions on alleged “blacklisting”:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

Ep56 - Eni finally responded. But...

Yesterday, I explained that after years of seeking a response from Eni, I took my case to its stakeholders, including major shareholders.

I continued to ask for the same thing:

📌 an independent investigation of the facts and documents.

In 2010, ENI finally reacted.

But not with the investigation I expected.

The company filed a lawsuit against me and the Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios (Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics) - an action I consider a hashtag#SLAPP - seeking €15 million for alleged defamation and damage to reputation.

That lawsuit introduced something crucial to this story.

Eni formally presented what I consider the “2nd version” of the events leading to my dismissal.

According to its filing, investigations conducted by Eni had found no retaliation, violation of law or breach of its Code of Ethics.

Eni then maintained that my dismissal was justified by my alleged “reticent and uncooperative conduct” during confidential investigations at the Brazilian subsidiary, allegedly undermining the relationship of trust.

This matters because this was Eni’s own version presented in judicial proceedings.

And it should be compared with earlier documents.

🔹 In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary’s CEO had presented what I consider the “1st version” of my dismissal: “an administrative and organizational restructuring”.

🔹 In 2003, before the Brazilian Labor Court, AGIP do Brasil argued that the company had the right to terminate an employment contract at any time.

🔹 In 2010, before an Italian court, a much more specific explanation emerged: my dismissal was said to be related to my alleged conduct during confidential internal investigations.

So what was the real reason for my dismissal?

And where did Eni obtain the information supporting this version?

Was it the result of an independent investigation by headquarters?

Or was it provided by the former Brazilian subsidiary?

After years of asking Eni to examine the documents, its judicial filing became another document to be examined.

I ask for something simple:

📌 compare the versions.

Compare what AGIP do Brasil stated through its CEO and before the Brazilian courts with what Eni later stated before an Italian court.

And consider one fundamental element: in my labor judgment, the judge recorded findings concerning the irregularities I reported and my conduct in relation to the Code of Ethics.

Then draw your own conclusion.

After twenty-five years, my request to Eni remains the same:

🔴 that the facts and the entire body of evidence be submitted to an independent, impartial and transparent review.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ E-mail CEO AGIP do Brasil (2002):
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ ENI lawsuit - 2010:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

3️⃣ Judgment in my labor case against AGIP do Brasil:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

Ep55 - Not answer... I turned to its stakeholders

Yesterday, I presented the Memorial that I sent to Eni’s new leadership on October 19, 2009.

After eight years of trying to be heard, I reconstructed in ten pages what had happened to me at AGIP do Brasil and once again placed the facts before the company’s highest governance bodies.

After all, the Board of Directors represents the highest expression of "Corporate Governance" and also serves as a "Guardian of Ethics", helping to establish and oversee the organization’s ethical tone.

I explained the irregularities I had reported.

My dismissal just weeks later.

The investigations and departures that followed.

The labor proceedings.

And the professional and personal consequences I was already facing.

I did this because I believed that a new leadership deserved the opportunity to examine the documents and reach its own conclusions.

But Eni did not respond.

Faced with yet another silence, I had to make a decision.

If those responsible for the company’s governance were unwilling to examine my case or even respond to my MEMORIAL, I would turn to those who also had a legitimate interest in knowing how Eni’s publicly stated ethical commitments were being applied in practice:

🔹 its stakeholders.

I then began sending communications about my case to Eni’s stakeholders, including its major shareholders - among them its largest shareholder, the Italian government.

I presented myself not only as a former executive of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary, but also as CEO of the Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios (Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics), an organization I founded after everything I had experienced.

My message had one central point:

📌 in my case, I believed Eni’s conduct did not correspond to the principles the company itself proclaimed in its Code of Ethics.

I was not asking stakeholders to accept my version.

I was putting before them a question that Eni’s own governance had left unanswered:

🔴 What should happen when an employee reports irregularities in accordance with the Code of Ethics, is dismissed weeks later, and for years asks the company to examine the documents?

My objective remained the same:

🔹 an independent investigation.

A response based on the documents.

And, if the facts were confirmed, corrective action capable of restoring my name, image, and reputation.

After years of trying to resolve the matter through institutional channels, I had reached out to the stakeholders.

And this time, Eni would react.

Not with the independent investigation I had expected.

In 2010, the company took legal action against me and against the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

That is the next chapter of this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2009 Memorial to ENI:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep54 - 2009: New letter to Eni’s Board of Directors

In 2009, after my labor lawsuit against AGIP do Brasil was definitively closed by the Brazilian Superior Labor Court on procedural grounds, without the merits of my appeal being reconsidered, I decided to contact Eni’s headquarters in Italy once again.

There was an important reason.

Eni had a new CEO, and new professionals were serving on its Board of Directors. This leadership might therefore not have been fully aware of what had happened to me at the former Brazilian subsidiary.

On October 19, 2009, I sent a ten-page MEMORIAL directly to Eni’s CEO, Paolo Scaroni, with copies to Chairman Roberto Poli, the Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors, and other governance bodies, reconstructing my history with the company.

I did not simply ask them to believe my word.

I presented a chronology: my hiring by AGIP Brasil; the professional results I achieved; my transfer to Cuiabá; the serious irregularities that came to my attention; my decision to report them in accordance with Eni’s Code of Ethics; and my dismissal just weeks later on the grounds of “breach of trust”.

I also reported something particularly relevant: following my reports, the regional manager who had been the subject of them and other employees from the Cuiabá Regional Office subsequently left the company.

And I reminded Eni’s new leadership that this was not my first attempt to be heard.

Since 2002, I had already approached the company’s Board, asking two simple questions:

🔹 What is the purpose of Eni’s Code of Ethics?

🔹 And what are the responsibilities of those entrusted with ensuring its implementation?

I received no answer.

But something happened afterwards.

Following my communications to Eni’s headquarters, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli, then COO of Refining & Marketing, came to Brazil. The investigations were followed locally by Paolo Grossi, an Eni executive from Rome and, by 2009, VP of Refining & Marketing. A series of departures followed, including regional managers and, later, the commercial director who had dismissed me.

That is why, in 2009, I decided to place the entire story once again before Eni’s highest governance bodies.

The Code of Ethics reproduced in my MEMORIAL stated that Eni should consider concerns raised by its stakeholders, oversee compliance with the Code, ensure transparency and, when necessary, take corrective action.

That was exactly what I expected.

An independent examination of the facts.

An answer.

And, if the facts were confirmed, corrective action.

The Memorial also made clear what I was seeking:

📌 to restore my name, my image, and my reputation.

After eight years of trying to be heard, I gave Eni’s new leadership another opportunity to examine what had happened in Brazil.

Eni’s response?

None.

And that silence would change the next chapter of this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2009 Memorial to ENI:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English
2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep53 - The labor proceedings ended

Yesterday, I showed that my appeal to the TRT-SP was not heard on the merits because of a procedural issue concerning proof of payment of court costs.

My lawyers did not give up.

During that period, I was introduced to Amauri Mascaro Nascimento, a leading Brazilian labor law scholar and founder of Mascaro Nascimento Advogados.

After learning about the case, he offered his law firm’s services without charging legal fees.

The dispute eventually reached Brazil’s Superior Labor Court (TST - Tribunal Superior do Trabalho).

And there was one particularly important element.

In 2005, CAIXA issued an official statement after reviewing its records.

Its conclusion was explicit:

📌 “The payment was duly made”.

CAIXA also acknowledged that it could have better advised me about obtaining the final receipt and stated that, after identifying problems with its self-service procedure, it suspended DARF collections through that module to adjust the process.

More importantly, CAIXA considered its confirmation sufficient to support the appeal and stated that there would be no reason for the Court to reject it.

Yet the merits remained outside the Court’s review.

The TST did not examine whether I had identified irregularities, complied with the Code of Ethics by reporting them, or whether my dismissal weeks later could have constituted retaliation.

The dispute remained procedural.

On May 27, 2009, the TST’s 5th Panel unanimously denied the appeal.

Thus ended a six-year legal battle.

Even with CAIXA’s official confirmation that the payment had been made, the procedural obstacle remained, and my retaliation claim was never reexamined on the merits by an appellate court.

There is another circumstance that has raised questions for me: by then, Eni’s Brazilian assets had already been acquired by Petrobras.

I have no evidence of any interference by Petrobras in the TST’s decision, and I do not present this hypothesis as fact.

The documented fact is this: the proceedings ended without the central issue being reexamined on appeal.

And the original judgment still recorded that I had identified irregularities, reported them to the appropriate persons, and fulfilled my duty as an employee and the Code of Ethics.

The labor proceedings were over.

But the Flinto Case was not.

I then received advice that would change the course of this story:

📌 go back directly to Eni.

Later in 2009, I would submit a new Memorial to Eni’s Board of Directors.

That is where I will resume this chronology next week.

After twenty-five years, my request to Eni remains the same:

🔴 that the facts and the entire body of evidence be submitted to an independent, impartial, and transparent review.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Caixa Statement:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ TST Judgment:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events - Event 22