Ep67 - The document wasn't there

Yesterday, I showed the 10 questions about the Flinto Case submitted by critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro before Eni’s 2017 AGM.

Eni did not answer them individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response - and presented a new version of the reasons for my dismissal.

According to Eni:

🔹 “[...] l’ex dipendente è stato licenziato, unitamente agli autori dei comportamenti illeciti, per reticenza, per aver violato l’obbligo della riservatezza e per il tentativo di utilizzare strumentalmente il Codice di Comportamento del Gruppo Eni per ottenere vantaggi personali dalla Società”

In other words, Eni stated that I had been dismissed, together with those responsible for the irregularities, for reticence, breach of confidentiality and attempting to use the Code of Conduct to obtain personal advantages from the company.

An extremely serious accusation.

But there was something even more important.

Eni cited an official source to support this narrative.

According to the company, the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale di Eni SpA in:

📌 Eni’s 2002 Annual Report.

Eni was therefore directing its shareholders to an official company document from 2002.

There was only one problem.

Eni’s 2002 Annual Report was not available on its website.

After an extensive internet search, I found it.

354 pages.

But I was looking for something specific.

I wanted to verify what Eni had told its shareholders.

Eni indicated where to find it:

🔹 the Collegio Sindacale Report.

I searched for the allegation that I had been dismissed for reticence, breach of confidentiality or attempting to obtain personal advantages through the Code of Conduct.

I did not find it.

Across the 354 pages of Eni’s 2002 Annual Report, there is not a single reference to Douglas Linares Flinto or the Flinto Case - much less to the conclusion Eni claimed in 2017 was recorded there.

So we have two official documents from the same company:

📌 AGM 2017: Eni stated that conclusions regarding my case had been recorded by the Collegio Sindacale in the 2002 Annual Report.

📌 ENI 2002 ANNUAL REPORT: that information is not there.

I am not asking anyone to believe me.

Both documents will be available.

Read Eni’s response.

Open the 2002 Annual Report.

Search.

And draw your own conclusion.

That is the principle behind this campaign:

🔴 the documents must speak for themselves.

A few months later, in September 2017, Eni initiated a new lawsuit against me.

And there is an important detail:

Eni attached Eni’s Way publications to its initial court filing.

Tomorrow, I will tell that story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2017 AGM Questions & Answers

2️⃣ Eni 2002 Annual Report

3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep66 - 2017: Ten questions. No individual answers!

In Apr 2017, my case reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) for the first time, under the leadership of Chair Emma Marcegaglia and CEO Claudio Descalzi.

Italian journalist and critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro, representing Fondazione Finanza Etica, included 10 questions about the Flinto Case among those formally submitted to the company before the AGM.

They were objective questions.

Among them:

1️⃣ Does Eni encourage its employees to report fraud, corruption and misconduct?

2️⃣ What should happen when an employee suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing?

3️⃣ Which of the different versions presented by Eni regarding my dismissal was true?

In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary had stated that my departure resulted from an “administrative and organizational restructuring”.

Later, Eni maintained that I had been dismissed because I failed to cooperate with an internal investigation and had adopted a “reticent” attitude.

Which version was true?

The questions continued:

4️⃣ If an internal investigation really took place in Brazil, why did Eni not present its findings as evidence in the lawsuit filed against me in Rome?

5️⃣ What did the Brazilian court decision cited by the company actually say in full?

6️⃣ If I was the person who reported the irregularities, how could I simultaneously have refused to cooperate and adopted a “reticent” attitude during the investigation?

7️⃣ Why did Eni never respond to the communications I sent to the Boards of Directors under Vittorio Mincato, Paolo Scaroni and Claudio Descalzi?

And further:

8️⃣ Why did Eni decide to sue me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics?

9️⃣ After the Rome Court found the lawsuit unfounded, why did the Board of Directors not instruct Internal Audit to investigate the Flinto Case?

🔟 Finally: what did Eni intend to do to correct the situation?

And here is the central point.

Eni did not answer the ten questions individually.

Instead, it provided a lengthy corporate response.

First, Eni stated that whistleblowing is an essential element of its Internal Control and Risk Management System and that its procedures should ensure that whistleblowers are not subjected to any form of retaliation.

Then it turned to me.

And it was in this response that Eni presented a new and extremely serious version of the reasons for my dismissal.

More than that:

📌 to lend credibility to this version, the company stated that the conclusions of its “in-depth investigations” into my case had been reported by the Collegio Sindacale in “Eni’s 2002 Annual Report”.

There was only one problem.

“Eni’s 2002 Annual Report” was not available on Eni’s corporate website.

But after an extensive search on the internet, I found this official company document.

And I went looking for what the company said had been published there.

Tomorrow, I will show what I found.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Questions and Answers before the 2017 AGM: https://shre.ink/GeON

Ep65 - From retaliation to a mission

Yesterday, while sharing what andrea greco and Giuseppe Oddo wrote about the Flinto Case in "Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo", I mentioned a consequence that would change my professional life.

Today, I want to tell that story.

In August 2003, two years after my dismissal from Agip do Brasil, I founded the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

What I experienced at the Brazilian subsidiary of the Italian oil giant was the trigger - the spark that led to the Institute’s creation.

I had reported irregularities internally, following the Code of Ethics I received when I joined Agip.

Weeks later, I was dismissed.

As documented throughout this series, I consider that dismissal retaliation for my report.

But from that experience emerged a conviction:

🔹 it was not enough to defend Ethics when problems occurred. We needed to build a culture in which doing the right thing was a permanent value.

That conviction gave birth to the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

Its mission:

📌 “To promote Ethics in corporate and educational environments with the support of companies that share the principles and values of Ethics”

Its vision:

📌 “To be a reference in promoting Ethics, improving the way business is conducted in Brazil and inspiring students to do the right thing”

Why companies and students?

Because companies do not have lives of their own.

People bring them to life.

People make decisions, report misconduct, decide whether to investigate - and choose between what is convenient and what is right.

That is why the Institute also works with a very special audience:

🔹 university students - the leaders of tomorrow’s companies.

And something fills us with pride:

📌 the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics is the only institution in the country that promotes Business Ethics among university students.

We believe there is no acceptable way to do business other than through Ethics.

That is why we say:

DO NOT SURRENDER TO DISHONESTY.

DO NOT GIVE IN TO MISCONDUCT.

BECOME A SLAVE TO ETHICS.

WITH INTEGRITY, WE BUILD AN UNASSAILABLE CHARACTER

AND FOLLOW A PATH TO SUCCESS.

WHEN MANY CHOOSE WHAT IS WRONG, ETHICS WHISPERS: 

DO THE RIGHT THING!

Looking back, what I consider one of the greatest injustices of my professional life produced something I never planned.

A dismissal ended my career at Agip.

Two years later, that experience helped create an institution dedicated to Business Ethics.

This August, the Institute celebrated 23 years.

And the story that began inside Agip/Eni continued.

In 2017, it reached Eni’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Rome.

A critical shareholder Mauro Meggiolaro submitted ten questions about the Flinto Case to the Board.

Tomorrow, I will show those questions - and how Eni decided to respond.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios

Ep64 - They examined the documents

In Mar 2016, after nearly five years of investigation, Italian journalists andrea greco and Giuseppe Oddo published Eni: Lo Stato Parallelo.

Among the stories selected was one from Brazil.

Mine.

The Flinto Case was the only Brazilian story published in the book.

I have discussed Lo Stato Parallelo before. Today, I want to show what the journalists actually wrote about my case.

The chapter begins with Brazil, Petrobras and Saipem. Then, referring to the Code of Ethics, the authors make a striking transition:

🔹 its application, they wrote, can become a “boomerang” and even lead to dismissal.

They then introduce my story.

The book recounts that, in 2001, as an AGIP Brasil executive in Cuiabá, I received detailed reports of irregularities involving my direct superior and other employees.

After verifying the reports through documents and conversations with operators, I acted based on the Code of Ethics I had received when joining Agip.

Weeks later, I was dismissed.

The authors record that my superiors initially cited a breakdown of the relationship of trust. After I appealed to the Ethics Committee, the company gave another explanation: administrative and organizational restructuring.

The book also reports my communication to Eni’s Board, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli’s trip to Brazil, subsequent dismissals and AGIP Brasil’s sale to Petrobras in 2004.

It records my continued contacts with Eni’s shareholders and other stakeholders and the legal action Eni brought against me in 2010.

In 2014, the Court found the action unfounded.

The chapter ends with my position: I had become a victim of my own whistleblowing; my career had been destroyed, but I did not regret that ethical battle and would continue fighting to restore my name, honor and reputation.

Months later, I asked Greco why they had included my story.

His answer was significant:

🔴 “We decided to include your story because, after reading most of the documents you sent us and speaking with our sources, we became convinced that your story was solid, and that it was right and interesting to include it in the context of Lo Stato Parallelo”

Two Italian investigative journalists had examined the documents, consulted their own sources and decided to include the Flinto Case in an investigation into Eni.

That is the principle behind this campaign:

🔹 I am not asking anyone simply to believe me.

📌 I am asking them to examine the documents.

And this story had another consequence.

What I experienced after my whistleblowing and dismissal contributed to a decision that would change my professional life.

In 2003, the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics was founded.

Tomorrow, I will tell that story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Book presentation

2️⃣ Chapter of the Flinto Case

3️⃣ E-mail Greco

4️⃣ Memorial (1999 - 2025)

5️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep63 - 2014: Eni’s Way goes public

In recent posts, I showed what happened before the Italian courts.

But alongside the legal dispute, one question remained:

📌 who within Eni would be willing to independently examine the documents I had been presenting for so many years?

I had already tried different paths.

In 2002, I took my case to the highest levels of governance - under CEO Vittorio Mincato.

In 2009, I presented the facts and documents again - under CEO Paolo Scaroni.

And in 2014, with a new Board of Directors, I tried once more.

A new Chairwoman: Emma Marcegaglia.

A new CEO: Claudio Descalzi.

A new Board: Andrea Gemma, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Alessandro Lorenzi, Moriani Diva, Fabrizio Pagani and Luigi Zingales.

For me, this was another opportunity for the facts to finally be examined.

But once again, that did not happen.

Three moments: 2002. 2009. 2014.

Three attempts to reach Eni’s governance.

It was then, still in 2014, that I made a decision that would change my strategy:

🔹 if the documents could not find room for an effective review within the company, I would take them to the public.

I decided to take the Flinto Case public.

And I created the "Eni’s Way" social media channels.

The name was not chosen by chance.

When I was an executive at Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary, "Eni’s Way" was the name of a global corporate publication.

One of its covers, which I still have, featured Enrico Mattei, accompanied by the headline:

🔹 “Il secolo di Mattei - The Century of Mattei”.

Years later, the publication was discontinued.

But the name remained in my memory.

In 2014, I brought it back for an entirely different purpose.

🔴 If “Eni’s Way” had once presented Eni to the world from the company’s own perspective, it would now present documents and events that were also part of my history with Eni.

And so, the "Eni’s Way" social media channels were born.

Not to ask people to believe my version.

But to do something more objective:

🔹 make the documents public.

Letters. Emails. Reports. Court decisions. Correspondence with governance bodies.

And a chronology allowing anyone interested to reconstruct the events and form their own opinion.

For years, I had insisted that Eni itself examine my case internally.

After the attempts in 2002, 2009 and again in 2014, I decided this story needed to move beyond the company’s walls.

That is how an old name from Eni’s corporate communications took on a new meaning.

🔷 ENI’S WAY.

The name remained.

Who told the story changed.

From that moment on, the dispute would no longer remain confined to internal channels and the courts.

The documents would begin to speak directly to the public.

And that decision would have consequences.

On Monday, I will continue from this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep62 - Eni: from €15 million to €5 million

Yesterday, I showed that, following the judgment of September 29, 2014, there were contacts between the lawyers representing the parties in Italy.

Those discussions culminated, on January 20, 2015, in my lawyer formally submitting a request for €5 million as compensation for the damages I claimed to have suffered over those years.

There appeared to be an opportunity to finally bring an end to a dispute that had already lasted more than a decade.

But an amicable settlement was not reached.

Eni decided to continue the legal battle.

The company appealed the judgment of the Civil Court of Rome that had rejected its claim against me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

But something changed on appeal.

And that detail deserves attention.

In the original lawsuit, Eni had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.

The Court rejected the claim, referring critically to the way the damages had been quantified at the substantial sum of €15 million.

Then, on appeal, Eni reduced its damages claim from €15 million to €5 million.

A reduction of €10 million - two-thirds of the amount originally claimed.

Coincidence or not, there was a particularly curious fact in that sequence.

Shortly before, during the discussions that followed the judgment, my lawyer had formally submitted to Eni a request for €5 million for the professional, financial, moral and reputational damages I claimed to have suffered.

Now, on appeal, €5 million had also become the amount Eni was seeking against me and the Institute.

I have no documentary evidence that allows me to state that there was a connection between these two amounts.

But the chronological and financial coincidence exists - and it is part of the reconstruction of events:

🔹 Eni claimed €15 million.

🔹 The Civil Court of Rome declared the claim unfounded and rejected the lawsuit.

🔹 There was an attempt to reach a settlement between the parties.

🔹 No settlement was reached.

🔹 Eni appealed - and reduced its claim to €5 million.

The case, therefore, did not end.

It continued for several more years before the Italian courts.

And on October 16, 2019, the Rome Court of Appeal would rule on that dispute.

But before we reach that point, there is another part of this story that needs to be told.

After so many years of trying to bring the documents to the company’s internal channels and different levels of governance, the dispute was beginning to move definitively beyond the corporate walls.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Civil Court of Rome Judgment:
🔹 original in Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Fax from Micali to D’Ercole:
🔹 original in Italian
🔹 English

3️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

4️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep61 - After the judgment: a €5 million proposal

On Sep 29, 2014, the Civil Court of Rome rejected the lawsuit brought by Eni against me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

The company had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.

The Court was clear:

🔹 “La domanda è infondata”.

🔷 “The claim is unfounded”.

For me, that decision could mean more than a legal victory.

It could open an opportunity to finally end a dispute that had lasted more than a decade.

After the judgment, there were contacts between the lawyers representing the parties in Italy.

On one side, Fabio Micali, my lawyer.

On the other, Stefano D’Ercole, from Studio Legale D'Ercole, the external lawyer representing Eni in that case.

Those contacts are not an assumption.

On Jan 20, 2015, my lawyer sent D’Ercole a formal fax beginning:

🔹 “Facendo seguito alla corrispondenza intercorsa sia per le vie brevi che a mezzo fax...”

In English:

🔷 “Following the correspondence exchanged both through direct contacts and by fax...”

The document itself therefore records that previous communications had already taken place between the lawyers representing the parties.

My lawyer described the professional, financial, moral and reputational damages I claimed to have suffered and formally requested, on behalf of myself and the Institute, €5 million as compensation for damages suffered and to be suffered.

I personally signed the document, fully ratifying its contents and requests.

The sequence deserves attention.

Eni had claimed €15 million against me and the Institute.

The Italian Court rejected that claim.

Months later, after contacts between the parties’ lawyers, my representative formally submitted to Eni a €5 million request for the damages I claimed to have suffered.

A negotiation of this magnitude was not an informal conversation between two individuals.

Both lawyers represented their respective clients in that litigation.

In my case, there is no doubt: Micali discussed the matter with me and formalized the document on my behalf, with my signature and express ratification.

As for Eni’s internal decision-making, I have no document showing who within the company followed or authorized each stage of the discussions.

But one fact is documented:

📌 my lawyer and the lawyer representing Eni had already been in contact before the €5 million request was formally submitted.

For me, this was a concrete opportunity to seek a solution and end a story that had begun in 2001.

But that did not happen.

The dispute continued.

What happened next added another chapter to this story.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.

❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Fax from Micali to D’Ercole:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Civil Court of Rome Judgment:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep60 - The claim is unfounded!

Yesterday, I ended this account at exactly this point.

In May 2014, with a new governance at Eni, I once again tried to bring my case to the company’s highest leadership.

Four months later, however, it would not be Eni that reached a conclusion about the documents.

It would be the Italian Court.

On September 29, 2014, the Civil Court of Rome issued its judgment in the lawsuit brought by Eni SpA against me and the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics (Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios).

The company was seeking damages for alleged defamation.

And the amount was far from insignificant:

Eni had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.

Judge Vittorio Contento made a particularly significant observation.

The judgment states that the damages had been:

🔹 “disinvoltamente specificati nell’ingente somma di € 15.000.000,00”.

In English:

🔹 “quantified in the substantial sum of €15 million”.

The wording is relevant: the judge did not literally use the term “exorbitant”, but described the €15 million as an “ingente somma” and used “disinvoltamente specificati” to describe how the damages had been quantified.

And at the beginning of its reasoning, the judgment states:

🔷 “La domanda è infondata”.

🔷 “The claim is unfounded”.

The Court observed that my numerous messages could, in principle, be considered offensive to the company’s image.

But that was not enough to establish the alleged damage.

According to the judgment, Eni had not indicated what harmful consequences to its image had resulted from my correspondence.

There is another significant passage.

The judge observed that it would be difficult to imagine that numerous authorities would form a negative image of Eni simply from messages received from an unknown employee, without first “accertare e valutare” - verifying and assessing - the dispute.

In the end, the decision was unequivocal:

🔹 “Rigetta la domanda”.

🔹 The Court rejected Eni’s claim.

It also ordered Eni SpA to reimburse me and the Institute €32,344.00 in legal costs, plus the other amounts specified in the judgment.

The contrast was significant.

On one side, Eni had quantified its alleged damages at €15 million.

On the other, a judgment declaring the claim unfounded, rejecting it, and ordering the company to pay legal costs.

After years of trying to bring the documents to different levels of Eni’s governance, there was now a new element:

📌 a decision by the Italian Court itself rejecting Eni’s lawsuit.

Could that judgment have created an opportunity to finally end the dispute?

That is what I thought too.

But that is not what happened.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.


❎ Learn more:
;
1️⃣ Civil Court of Rome Judgment — Sep 29, 2014:
🔹 original in Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep59 - 2014: A new Eni Board. But...

In May 2014, a new chapter began in Eni’s governance.

The company had a new Chairwoman, Emma Marcegaglia, a new CEO, Claudio Descalzi, and a newly appointed Board of Directors.

For me, that change represented a new opportunity.

By then, I had already made several attempts to bring my case to the company’s highest levels.

I had written to AGIP Brazil’s leadership (2001), the Ethics Committee (2002), and Eni’s Board of Directors in Rome (2002).

In 2009, following another change in governance, I sent a ten-page MEMORIAL to then-CEO Paolo Scaroni, copying Chairman Roberto Poli, members of the Board, the Board of Statutory Auditors and other governance bodies.

My intention was always the same:

📌 to give Eni the opportunity to examine the documents and reach its own conclusions.

In 2014, once again, there was a new leadership that had not been involved in the events of 2001.

So I decided to try once more.

On April 15, 2014, even before the new governance was formally confirmed, I wrote to Emma Marcegaglia, briefly presenting my story and asking that my case be examined.

After the new leadership was confirmed, on May 9, I wrote again.

The subject line said exactly:

🔷 “Guardians of Ethics at Eni SpA”.

The message was addressed to Emma Marcegaglia, with copies to Claudio Descalzi and members of Eni’s new governance, including Andrea Gemma, Pietro Guindani, Karina Litvack, Alessandro Lorenzi, Moriani Diva, Fabrizio Pagani and Luigi Zingales, as well as members of the company’s oversight bodies.

In that message, I expressed a conviction I still hold today:

🔴 members of the Board should also act as “Guardians of Ethics”, respecting not only the letter but also the spirit of the company’s Code of Ethics.

I also sent the Memorial concerning my case, in English.

I was not asking them to accept my version of events.

The documents existed.

AGIP’s internal audit existed.

The witness statements existed.

My communications to the company since 2001 existed.

And the events that followed my reports also existed.

What I expected was simple

🔹 to examine the documents;

🔹 to determine what had actually happened;

🔹 and to reach an independent conclusion.

Changes in leadership can provide an opportunity to revisit past decisions through new eyes.

But another important element was unfolding.

While I was once again trying to be heard by Eni, a lawsuit brought against me by the company itself was approaching a decisive moment in Italy.

On September 29, 2014, the Italian Court would issue its ruling.

That decision would add another document to the story I am reconstructing in this series.

Tomorrow, I will continue from exactly this point.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Email “Guardians of Ethics at Eni SpA” (May 9, 2014 — original in English)

2️⃣ Memorial (1999–2025)

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events
 

Ep58 - Whistleblowing should not end in punishment

Yesterday, I showed a document that, years after my dismissal, recorded something I had been unable to explain.

According to a statement by a ROYAL FIC executive, a version was circulating in the job market claiming that I had been involved in the fraud and acts of corruption at AGIP do Brasil.

Not the employee who had reported the irregularities.

But someone allegedly involved in them.

I also made clear what I cannot prove:

📌 I have no document showing who created this narrative, who spread it, or how far it circulated.

But I can show what happened afterward.

My executive career practically ended.

And there is a particularly painful contrast.

In 2004, Petrobras acquired assets from AGIP Brasil.

All my former colleagues who remained with the company - those who were not dismissed when Eni acted at its Brazilian subsidiary - were incorporated into Petrobras and were able to continue their careers at Brazil’s state-controlled oil company.

I did not have that opportunity.

And there is an important detail: regular entry into Petrobras requires a public competitive examination.

The acquisition gave those employees an exceptional opportunity for professional continuity.

Had I not been dismissed in 2001, would I have followed the same path?

I cannot prove what did not happen.

But I lost the possibility of having that opportunity.

That is what I consider a “loss of a chance”.

The consequences went further.

Unable to rebuild my executive career, I faced financial and economic difficulties.

Without regular professional income, I also became unable to maintain regular contributions to INSS - Brazil’s public Social Security system.

Decades later, this affected:

🔹 my retirement benefits.

This story, therefore, has never been only about a dismissal in 2001.

It is about what can happen after a professional reports irregularities and his reputation is called into question.

A professional decision can take only minutes.

Its consequences can last for decades.

That is why modern whistleblowing systems should not merely receive reports.

They must protect those who report in good faith against retaliation and professional harm.

After twenty-five years, I continue to ask the Italian oil giant Eni for something at the heart of Corporate Governance best practices:

📌 that the documents be examined together and independently.

My report.

My dismissal.

The subsequent investigations.

The different versions of my dismissal.

The information that, according to a notarized statement, circulated in the job market.

And the consequences.

Only an independent, impartial and transparent review of the entire body of evidence can answer the question that has followed this story since 2001:

🔴 what really happened after I decided to follow the Code of Ethics and report the irregularities?


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Memorial 1999–2025

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep57 - What does the market say about me?

Yesterday, I showed a 2010 court document in which Eni presented a new explanation for my dismissal from AGIP do Brasil.

But one question had remained unanswered for years:

📌 Why was I unable to rebuild my executive career?

I had experience, professional results and extensive knowledge of the fuel industry.

Yet after my dismissal, my career changed dramatically.

Then a particularly important document emerged.

An executive from Royal FIC, where I worked from Aug 2002 to Feb 2003, put in writing what, according to him, was circulating in the job market:

🔷 “The job market claims that Douglas Linares Flinto was dismissed from Agip Brasil because of his involvement in the internal fraud and acts of corruption that occurred in 2001 within the Regional Sales Management in Cuiabá”.

Read that again.

According to that statement, the market was not saying that I had reported the irregularities.

It was saying that I had been involved in them.

Yet Royal FIC hired me because, according to the same document, it believed my account:

📌 that I was the whistleblower who reported the facts in accordance with the company’s Code of Ethics.

The executive added that while he worked with me, “there was never anything that discredited me”.

That document changed my understanding of what might have happened to my career.

There was now a written record that an extremely damaging version about me was circulating in the job market.

Who created this narrative?

Who spread it?

How far did it circulate?

I do not have a document that allows me to answer those questions definitively.

I do not present as fact what I cannot prove.

But one thing can be documented:

🔹 the statement records that this information was circulating in the job market.

And that raises an unavoidable question:

🔴 What realistic chance does an executive have to rebuild his career when the market associates him with the very fraud and corruption he says he reported?

In Brazil, the informal circulation of information intended to prevent workers from finding new employment is often described as “blacklisting”.

Brazilian Labor Courts have addressed allegations involving this type of practice.

Almost ten years later, a possible explanation was emerging for what had profoundly changed my professional life.

But the consequences went further.

They include what I consider the “loss of a chance” at Petrobras, as well as the effects on my assets, Social Security contributions and, years later, my retirement benefits.

That is what I will show tomorrow.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Statement by the Royal FIC executive:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ VEJA article on “blacklisting” in the Brazilian job market:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

3️⃣ Brazilian Superior Labor Court (TST) decisions on alleged “blacklisting”:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

Ep56 - Eni finally responded. But...

Yesterday, I explained that after years of seeking a response from Eni, I took my case to its stakeholders, including major shareholders.

I continued to ask for the same thing:

📌 an independent investigation of the facts and documents.

In 2010, ENI finally reacted.

But not with the investigation I expected.

The company filed a lawsuit against me and the Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios (Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics) - an action I consider a hashtag#SLAPP - seeking €15 million for alleged defamation and damage to reputation.

That lawsuit introduced something crucial to this story.

Eni formally presented what I consider the “2nd version” of the events leading to my dismissal.

According to its filing, investigations conducted by Eni had found no retaliation, violation of law or breach of its Code of Ethics.

Eni then maintained that my dismissal was justified by my alleged “reticent and uncooperative conduct” during confidential investigations at the Brazilian subsidiary, allegedly undermining the relationship of trust.

This matters because this was Eni’s own version presented in judicial proceedings.

And it should be compared with earlier documents.

🔹 In 2002, the Brazilian subsidiary’s CEO had presented what I consider the “1st version” of my dismissal: “an administrative and organizational restructuring”.

🔹 In 2003, before the Brazilian Labor Court, AGIP do Brasil argued that the company had the right to terminate an employment contract at any time.

🔹 In 2010, before an Italian court, a much more specific explanation emerged: my dismissal was said to be related to my alleged conduct during confidential internal investigations.

So what was the real reason for my dismissal?

And where did Eni obtain the information supporting this version?

Was it the result of an independent investigation by headquarters?

Or was it provided by the former Brazilian subsidiary?

After years of asking Eni to examine the documents, its judicial filing became another document to be examined.

I ask for something simple:

📌 compare the versions.

Compare what AGIP do Brasil stated through its CEO and before the Brazilian courts with what Eni later stated before an Italian court.

And consider one fundamental element: in my labor judgment, the judge recorded findings concerning the irregularities I reported and my conduct in relation to the Code of Ethics.

Then draw your own conclusion.

After twenty-five years, my request to Eni remains the same:

🔴 that the facts and the entire body of evidence be submitted to an independent, impartial and transparent review.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ E-mail CEO AGIP do Brasil (2002):
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ ENI lawsuit - 2010:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

3️⃣ Judgment in my labor case against AGIP do Brasil:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

Ep55 - Not answer... I turned to its stakeholders

Yesterday, I presented the Memorial that I sent to Eni’s new leadership on October 19, 2009.

After eight years of trying to be heard, I reconstructed in ten pages what had happened to me at AGIP do Brasil and once again placed the facts before the company’s highest governance bodies.

After all, the Board of Directors represents the highest expression of "Corporate Governance" and also serves as a "Guardian of Ethics", helping to establish and oversee the organization’s ethical tone.

I explained the irregularities I had reported.

My dismissal just weeks later.

The investigations and departures that followed.

The labor proceedings.

And the professional and personal consequences I was already facing.

I did this because I believed that a new leadership deserved the opportunity to examine the documents and reach its own conclusions.

But Eni did not respond.

Faced with yet another silence, I had to make a decision.

If those responsible for the company’s governance were unwilling to examine my case or even respond to my MEMORIAL, I would turn to those who also had a legitimate interest in knowing how Eni’s publicly stated ethical commitments were being applied in practice:

🔹 its stakeholders.

I then began sending communications about my case to Eni’s stakeholders, including its major shareholders - among them its largest shareholder, the Italian government.

I presented myself not only as a former executive of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary, but also as CEO of the Instituto Brasileiro de Ética nos Negócios (Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics), an organization I founded after everything I had experienced.

My message had one central point:

📌 in my case, I believed Eni’s conduct did not correspond to the principles the company itself proclaimed in its Code of Ethics.

I was not asking stakeholders to accept my version.

I was putting before them a question that Eni’s own governance had left unanswered:

🔴 What should happen when an employee reports irregularities in accordance with the Code of Ethics, is dismissed weeks later, and for years asks the company to examine the documents?

My objective remained the same:

🔹 an independent investigation.

A response based on the documents.

And, if the facts were confirmed, corrective action capable of restoring my name, image, and reputation.

After years of trying to resolve the matter through institutional channels, I had reached out to the stakeholders.

And this time, Eni would react.

Not with the independent investigation I had expected.

In 2010, the company took legal action against me and against the Brazilian Institute for Business Ethics.

That is the next chapter of this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2009 Memorial to ENI:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English

2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep54 - 2009: New letter to Eni’s Board of Directors

In 2009, after my labor lawsuit against AGIP do Brasil was definitively closed by the Brazilian Superior Labor Court on procedural grounds, without the merits of my appeal being reconsidered, I decided to contact Eni’s headquarters in Italy once again.

There was an important reason.

Eni had a new CEO, and new professionals were serving on its Board of Directors. This leadership might therefore not have been fully aware of what had happened to me at the former Brazilian subsidiary.

On October 19, 2009, I sent a ten-page MEMORIAL directly to Eni’s CEO, Paolo Scaroni, with copies to Chairman Roberto Poli, the Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors, and other governance bodies, reconstructing my history with the company.

I did not simply ask them to believe my word.

I presented a chronology: my hiring by AGIP Brasil; the professional results I achieved; my transfer to Cuiabá; the serious irregularities that came to my attention; my decision to report them in accordance with Eni’s Code of Ethics; and my dismissal just weeks later on the grounds of “breach of trust”.

I also reported something particularly relevant: following my reports, the regional manager who had been the subject of them and other employees from the Cuiabá Regional Office subsequently left the company.

And I reminded Eni’s new leadership that this was not my first attempt to be heard.

Since 2002, I had already approached the company’s Board, asking two simple questions:

🔹 What is the purpose of Eni’s Code of Ethics?

🔹 And what are the responsibilities of those entrusted with ensuring its implementation?

I received no answer.

But something happened afterwards.

Following my communications to Eni’s headquarters, Angelo Mario Taraborrelli, then COO of Refining & Marketing, came to Brazil. The investigations were followed locally by Paolo Grossi, an Eni executive from Rome and, by 2009, VP of Refining & Marketing. A series of departures followed, including regional managers and, later, the commercial director who had dismissed me.

That is why, in 2009, I decided to place the entire story once again before Eni’s highest governance bodies.

The Code of Ethics reproduced in my MEMORIAL stated that Eni should consider concerns raised by its stakeholders, oversee compliance with the Code, ensure transparency and, when necessary, take corrective action.

That was exactly what I expected.

An independent examination of the facts.

An answer.

And, if the facts were confirmed, corrective action.

The Memorial also made clear what I was seeking:

📌 to restore my name, my image, and my reputation.

After eight years of trying to be heard, I gave Eni’s new leadership another opportunity to examine what had happened in Brazil.

Eni’s response?

None.

And that silence would change the next chapter of this story.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ 2009 Memorial to ENI:
🔹 Italian
🔹 English
2️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events

Ep53 - The labor proceedings ended

Yesterday, I showed that my appeal to the TRT-SP was not heard on the merits because of a procedural issue concerning proof of payment of court costs.

My lawyers did not give up.

During that period, I was introduced to Amauri Mascaro Nascimento, a leading Brazilian labor law scholar and founder of Mascaro Nascimento Advogados.

After learning about the case, he offered his law firm’s services without charging legal fees.

The dispute eventually reached Brazil’s Superior Labor Court (TST - Tribunal Superior do Trabalho).

And there was one particularly important element.

In 2005, CAIXA issued an official statement after reviewing its records.

Its conclusion was explicit:

📌 “The payment was duly made”.

CAIXA also acknowledged that it could have better advised me about obtaining the final receipt and stated that, after identifying problems with its self-service procedure, it suspended DARF collections through that module to adjust the process.

More importantly, CAIXA considered its confirmation sufficient to support the appeal and stated that there would be no reason for the Court to reject it.

Yet the merits remained outside the Court’s review.

The TST did not examine whether I had identified irregularities, complied with the Code of Ethics by reporting them, or whether my dismissal weeks later could have constituted retaliation.

The dispute remained procedural.

On May 27, 2009, the TST’s 5th Panel unanimously denied the appeal.

Thus ended a six-year legal battle.

Even with CAIXA’s official confirmation that the payment had been made, the procedural obstacle remained, and my retaliation claim was never reexamined on the merits by an appellate court.

There is another circumstance that has raised questions for me: by then, Eni’s Brazilian assets had already been acquired by Petrobras.

I have no evidence of any interference by Petrobras in the TST’s decision, and I do not present this hypothesis as fact.

The documented fact is this: the proceedings ended without the central issue being reexamined on appeal.

And the original judgment still recorded that I had identified irregularities, reported them to the appropriate persons, and fulfilled my duty as an employee and the Code of Ethics.

The labor proceedings were over.

But the Flinto Case was not.

I then received advice that would change the course of this story:

📌 go back directly to Eni.

Later in 2009, I would submit a new Memorial to Eni’s Board of Directors.

That is where I will resume this chronology next week.

After twenty-five years, my request to Eni remains the same:

🔴 that the facts and the entire body of evidence be submitted to an independent, impartial, and transparent review.


❎ Learn more:

1️⃣ Caixa Statement:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

2️⃣ TST Judgment:
🔹 Portuguese
🔹 English

3️⃣ Chronology of Facts for the Reconstruction of Events - Event 22