Wednesday, December 07, 2022

KEY POINT: Eni SpA x Douglas Flinto


A very important fact that needs to be noted by Eni's Board in relation to the "3rd version" about my dismissal presented by the company during the Shareholders' Meeting (AGM 2017).

And that's because, there are only two possibilities for the content of Eni's presentation regarding the "3rd version" of my dismissal: either the version is "true” or the version is "false".

Therefore, when reading this post, Eni's Board would need to be “fully convinced” about the truth or falsity of this version about my dismissal. So, in my understanding, this context became the most important fact in this Specific Instance, and should be clarified and proven by the Parties.

Therefore, when reading this post, Eni's Board would need to be “fully convinced” about the truth or falsity of this version about my dismissal. So, in my understanding, this context became the most important fact of our history of more than 21 long years, and should be clarified and proven by me and also by Eni's Board.

Now, if this 3rd version about my dismissal is the true version, then I was fired for participating in the millionaire scheme just like all the other employees of illicit behavior involved in the frauds and acts of corruption in the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni and, therefore, I am nothing more than an unscrupulous and opportunistic person because, for more than 21 years, I have been supporting an untrue story to take financial advantage of Eni.

On the other hand, if this 3rd version about my dismissal is the “false version, Eni will need to clarify to your Stakeholders the reasons for the company to conduct my case in the way it was stated (and proven) by me in this post. 

Therefore, Eni will first need to thank me for my "ethical courage" in having followed the words and spirit of Eni's Code of Ethics and recognize that I was the “whistleblower” (as recognized by the Brazilian labor court), because, in fact, I was “unfairly” fired by executives, including members of the board of the Brazilian subsidiary of the Respondent in “retaliation”. 

Furthermore, in accordance with the corporate commitments and also the international commitments followed and accepted by company, Eni will then need to take the conduct expected by UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, "Principles 01 & 02" of the UN Global Compact and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, described in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct

Apologize” to me and make a significant and proportionate "reparation" for the damages and losses I have suffered in all these more than 21 long years, because, in fact, my name was included in the “black list” of the Brazilian labor market, “destroying” my professional career forever and, as a consequence, I lost my “retirement”. As if it were not enough, when being unfairly fired, the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni made me “miss the chance” of having had a promising career at Petrobras alongside all my honest colleagues who have been there from 2004 until today.

So, Eni, in addition to not protecting the whistleblower, as determined by the principles enshrined in its own Code of Ethics, also attacked my honor and reputation with a “false version” of the real reasons for my dismissalviolating international commitments on human rights.


The 2nd version of my dismissal

Let us remember that, in 2010, when Eni brought the first lawsuit against me for libel and defamation, the company carried out the first attack on my honor and reputation when it presented the 2nd version of my dismissal in the initial petition:

“To facilitate the comprehension of the Magistrate, I anticipate that, bearing in mind the communication of Douglas Flinto, while having not offered any documentary evidence that supports what was affirmed, he proposes a instrumental (functional) reconstruction of the causes that determined his termination from Agip Brazil in 2001, and used ENI's Code of Ethics with the only goal of openly and repeatedly defaming and discrediting the company.

We emphasize that, from the further developments conducted by ENI, nothing proves that any retaliation or violation of the law, nor of the consecrated principles in ENI's Code of Ethics, were practiced in prejudice to the employee from the former controlled Agip Brazil and, for bigger reason, from the former controlled ENI.

On the other hand, it is important to highlight that Douglas Flinto's termination had full justification in the reticent behavior and non-collaborative posture showed by the employee in the occasion of the company's undercover investigation that had as a goal to reveal potential prejudicial acts to the company itself, ceasing the trusting relationship with the company. His dismissal was unquestionably confirmed and recognized fully legitimate in the judicial instances in Brazil(Doc. 01).


Despite my labor lawsuit against Eni's Brazilian subsidiary, which was filed in 2003 and finalized in 2009 — not for reasons of "merit", but for purely "procedural problems” (Doc. 02: Regional Labor Court Judgment and Doc. 03: Superior Labor Court Judgment) —, the judge of the 1st instance, due to total ignorance of what happens to whistleblowers in the global corporate world, could not see the moral damage I had suffered.

However, this judge recorded in the court decision (Doc. 04), dated March 29, 2004, that I, "fulfillingthe determinations of the Code of Ethics of Eni, provided "whistleblowing" of irregularities and illegalities that took place at AGIP Brazil. Therefore, the Brazilian Labor Court itself recognized that I was the whistleblower!

So, it is “uncontroversial” in our history: I am the “whistleblower”, despite Eni never admitting this fact!

Now, if I am the whistleblower, Eni's Board needs to “re-evaluate” our entire story based on this absolutely “uncontroversial” fact, and “manifest” itself to your Stakeholders.

Important Note: In 2015, these facts were presented to NCP Italy when I reported my allegations (“fully substantiated”) on Eni's non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines (Doc. 05), but NCP Italy decided not to proceed with this Specific Instance and filed this procedure without offering the Good Offices (Doc. 06).


It is also extremely pertinent to clarify that, when Mr. Mauro Meggiolaro, the Eni's critical shareholder, took my case for the first time to the Shareholders' Meeting (AGM) in 2017, he asked 10 (ten) questions — involving the "actions" and "omissions" of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and Eni itself (Doc. 07) — to be answered by the Board of Directors:

1) Are the employees, at any hierarchical level, encouraged by Eni to report to the company's internal channels - and / or the immediate superior - any fraud and corruption, misconduct of any other Eni employee, including the CEO, or even because of disagreements with the words and spirit of the company's Code of Ethics? Why is it important that its employees provide reports of irregularities and illegal activities? What are the measurable (and immeasurable) gains for the company?;

2) If an employee who reported something suffers any kind of retaliation, what actions should this employee take? Who, within the company's organizational chart, should the employee who’s suffered some type of reprisal look for? If the retaliation to an employee is confirmed, what are the attitudes that Eni will take?;

3) In 2001, after Mr. Flinto invoked Eni's "Ethics Commission" in Brazil, the CEO of the company's Brazilian operation stated (through an e-mail sent directly to Mr. Flinto) that his resignation was not a "retaliation", but rather an "administrative and organizational restructuring". Eni's headquarters in Italy says that it conducted an "internal investigation" in Brazil to investigate possible damage to the company itself and Mr. Flinto "did not cooperate" with the investigations and had a "reticent posture", resulting in a "breach of trust" and also in his "dismissal". Which of the "versions" presented by Eni about Mr. Flinto's dismissal is "true"?;

4) If there was an "internal investigation" in Brazil, why did Eni not present the results of this investigation as a "proof" in the lawsuit filed by Eni at the Court of Rome against Mr. Flinto?;

5) Eni states that the resignation of Mr. Flinto was "confirmed" by the competent courts of Brazil. Did Eni have access to the sentence of the Brazilian Justice? What was sentenced (“in full”) by the Brazilian Judge?;

6) If, in fact, Eni had access to the Brazilian court ruling, the company would know that the Judge stated in its sentence that "there was a Code of Ethics in Eni", that "there were irregularities and illegal activities in the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni" and that "Mr. Flinto provided a report to the company's internal channels" as it is imperative in the code itself. Now, if Mr. Flinto blew the whistle, if he sounded the alarm, providing a report about an alleged million-dollar scheme of fraud and corruption installed in the Brazilian subsidiary, then how come that Mr. Flinto "did not cooperate" and had a "reticent posture" in the time when the “internal investigations” were conducted, as it is stated by Eni?;

7) Why did Eni not respond to Mr. Flinto's correspondence sent to the company's "Board of Directors" under the management of Mr. Vittorio Mincato (2002), Mr. Paolo Scaroni (2009) and Mr. Claudio Descalzi (2014) reporting in full detail his retaliation case, after filing a complaint?;

8) Why, instead, did Eni choose to move a lawsuit against Mr. Flinto and the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute asking for a reparation of €15m?;

9) The ruling of the court of Rome says that the lawsuit brought by Eni against Mr. Flinto (and against the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute) is "groundless" and that the company hasn't specified any criteria for the assessment of alleged damages amounting at €15m. Why did the Board of Eni not ask the company's Internal Audit Department to conduct an "investigation" into Mr. Flinto's case?;

10) What does Eni intend to do in Mr. Flinto's case? What are the corrective actions against Mr. Flinto that can be put into practice by the company?.


However, instead of Eni answering each of these questions "individually", Eni "strategically" chose to produce a long text and coined the “corporate speech” to my detriment that had already been used by Eni on November 10, 2016, therefore, before the AGM 2017, to answer to the numerous “requests for clarification” made by Eni's Stakeholders —including the Italian government, the controlling shareholder — when I made contact to ask these Eni's Stakeholders for help.

Note that in the year 2016, I had made a complaint (Doc. 08) to the “Ethics Committee” of IIA Global, which is the largest representative institution for internal auditors worldwide. The accused were: a) Mr. Marco Petracchini (Internal Audit - Senior Executive Vice President) of Eni — who, at that time, was a member of the Board of the Italian branch office of this institution: AIIA Italy and, at the end of 2017, was the “co-author” of the second lawsuit that Eni move against me; b) Ms. Francesca Cottone, (Vice President Spot & Fraud Audit and Whistleblowing) of the Eni; and, c) Mr. Marcos Antonio Pinto (Internal Audit General Manager at Liquigás, a subsidiary of Petrobras) — who, until 2004, held a similar role in the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni.

In response to my complaint, Eni wrote to the CEO of AIIA Italy:

“The former employee of AGIP Brazil (former subsidiary of ENI, sold to third parties in 2004), after his departure in 2001, filed a lawsuit against AGIP Brazil for damages, not being successful in various degrees of judgment.

At the same time, on his own account and as a representative of the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute, Mr. Flinto began a personal battle against ENI. Since 2002, he has been sending a multitude of emails with defamatory content about the company.

In 2009, due to the repetition of these communications, ENI filed a civil lawsuit for defamation against Mr. Flinto. This process is currently in the appeal phase.

During 2014, the former employee also reinforced his communication initiatives with the creation, for alleged ethical purposes: of a website dedicated to ENI (www.enisway.com); a Blog and social media accounts of Eni's Way (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram). However, negative news about ENI is published and continuously implemented, retrieved from the network regardless of its validity, accompanied by derogatory comments and images. Even the communication received by IIA Global was published on websites and social networks.

In view of the most recent initiatives against ENI and its management and, in particular, against the entire structure directed by me and against myself, solely because of the position we hold, we are preparing the widest protection in criminal proceedings” (Doc. 09).


The 3rd version of my dismissal

Also note that, in addition to Eni using the same “corporate speech” to answer its critical shareholder during the 2017 AGM, a paragraph of this long text caught my attention because Eni presented the "3rd version" about my dismissal:

Contrary to what Mr. Flinto believes [...] The ex-employee was fired along with other actors of illicit behavior, for reticence, for having violated the obligation of confidentiality and for trying to instrumentally use the ENI Code of Ethics for personal advantage of the company(Doc. 10).


In order to give “credibility” to this (untrue, defamatory, and slanderous) allegation made during the 2017 AGM, Eni stated — in this same document (Doc. 10) — that the result of this "investigation" had been published in the ENI Balance Sheet 2002 (Doc. 11). 

However, in the “354” pages of this “official document” by Eni (found only after an exhaustive internet search), there is not a single line about me... And there couldn't be!

Now, it's obvious! Eni “never” carried out an “in-depth investigation” into my case, as described by Eni in its “corporate policy” on the “Whistleblowing Process” (Doc. 12) - document attached to the Respondent's Code of Ethics.

Likewise, Eni has always "refused" to carry out a "due diligence" on my case in light of the international commitments accepted and followed by the company.

It is indisputable that the content of the "3rd version" about my dismissal was an even more serious attack on my honor and reputation unfairly promoted by Eni.


The New Documents

It is also extremely important to note that, when Eni presented the 2nd version about my dismissal in 2010, AGIP Brazil had not been a company controlled by Eni since 2004, much less in 2017, when the company presented the 3rd version about my dismissal.

So, based on this reasoning, how did Eni stated in a “lawsuit” (2010) and in an “official document” from the company (AGM 2017) available on its corporate website the circumstances of my dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni? Was Eni able to invent all this? Or did the company just replicate and share the information provided by AGIP Brazil about me before Eni's Brazilian assets were sold to Petrobras in 2004?

It is evident that I was always fully aware that my unfair dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni had been a retaliation, and I also knew very well that the internal audit carried out at the Cuiabá Regional Sales Management (GRV- Cuiabá) had been a “fake” one because I was able to build a “DOSSIER” (Doc. 13) with more than 200 pages, proving the irregularities and illegalities in the GRV-Cuiabá despite not being an internal auditor. Therefore, how did the experts internal auditors of the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni not discover the conflicts of interest, internal fraud, and acts of corruption that I had denounced?

Now, if the "internal audit report" produced by AGIP Brazil had demonstrated everything I had denounced and proved by the documents contained in my "dossier", the company's first action would be the dismissal of the Regional Sales Manager of Cuiabá, his subordinates, and even his superiors, including the Commercial Director, located at the company's headquarters in Brazil.

However, the story narrated (and proven) in this post confirms that things did not happen this way... The first to be fired was the one who should not have been, that is, the one who, complying with the determinations of Eni's Code of Ethics, had the “ethical courage” to report: the whistleblower!

So, making use of the legal precepts of the Law for Access to Information (LAI), I requested that the Ministry of Transparency and General Controllership of the Union (CGU) determine that Petrobras send me all the documents referring to the investigation process of my complaint, reported to the “Petrobras Whistleblowing Channel”, in 2017, and having as a motivating fact the fraudulent internal audit carried out by AGIP Brazil in 2001.

On June 24, 2019, the CGU issued its decision, in the following terms: 

“It is decided that the appeal should be granted, so that all documents relevant to their complaint reported to the PETROBRAS Whistleblower Channel in 2017 are forwarded to the citizen” (Doc. 14).


I confess that, not even in my best dreams, I could have imagined that one day the documents produced by AGIP Brazil and by Eni itself in 2001 and 2002 would be placed in my hands, and they would make even more proof of everything that I have repeatedly said during all these more than 21 long years: “my unfair dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of the Eni was a retaliation imposed by those I had denounced, including members of the direction.

Note carefully the “content” of the documents I received from Petrobras, the successor to the Eni’s Brazilian assets:

Document 01:
Internal Audit Report (Doc. 15)

Prepared on July 26, 2001, the date after my complaint was made to the commercial direction and just six days before my dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni.

The report, signed by the general manager of internal audit of AGIP Brazil at the time, pointed out only the "false invoices" issued against the company TELEMAT, proving what I had always said: the internal audit carried out at the Regional Sales Management of Cuiabá (GRV-Cuiabá) was a farce, as it did not point out all the conflicts of interest, internal fraud, and acts of corruption practiced by a group of employees, including the regional sales manager, in collusion with customers, to rob the coffers of Eni at about US$ 20 million a year. All these irregularities and illegalities had been indicated in my complaint and proved by my “dossier”.

Document 02:
Internal Audit Memorandum to the CEO of AGIP Brazil (Doc. 16)

A memorandum dated February 7, 2002, signed by the general manager of internal audit and sent to the CEO of Eni's Brazilian subsidiary, with a copy to the directors of the financial and commercial areas, just six days after I filed a new complaint — involving the operational area at GRV-Cuiabá — when I invoked the “Ethics Commission” in Brazil.

 The internal audit found that the former regional sales manager of GRV-Cuiabá did not appear in the "official documentation" of the two service stations owned by AGIP Brazil and operated by him, proving another point of my first complaint when I was an executive at Eni's Brazilian subsidiary: these service stations were in the hands of “front-men”.

Document 03:
Facsimile of the Respondent (Doc. 17)  

A fax sent by the headquarters of the Respondent (Italy) to the CEO of AGIP Brazil, on October 03, 2002, two months after my “complaint” was delivered to each of the members of the Board of Directors of Eni and to the main executives of the company, including the global CEO and the boss of the CEO of Eni's Brazilian subsidiary.

In this document, it is requested: “As agreed by telephone, I am sending you the documentation received from Douglas Linares Flinto. I request you to analyze and deepen the various points and send me your considerations as soon as possible”.

Document 04:
Memorandum from HR and Internal Audit to the CEO of AGIP Brazil (Doc. 18)

Just four days later, on October 7, 2002, a “memorandum” was signed by the director of Human Resources together with the general manager of Internal Audit of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary.

This said document was sent to the CEO's AGIP Brazil with the circumstances of my dismissal, in response to the questions from Eni's headquarters (Italy).

Note that the content of this memorandum made me prove, with my own eyes, what I had always claimed: that members of the direction were involved in the irregularities and illegalities that took place in the bowels of the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni. And that's because the executives I denounced built a "new plot" to justify my dismissal, with the sole and Machiavellian purpose of disqualifying me, transforming me from a dedicated, committed, and excellent employee who fulfilled the determinations of Eni’s Code of Ethics, into an unbalanced, unscrupulous, unreliable, disloyal, and opportunistic professional. And what is even worse! The Brazilian subsidiary of Eni claimed between the lines that I was part of the “criminal organization” that operated in GRV-Cuiabá.

Check out the full text of what AGIP Brazil said about me:

In June 2001, the president of SindiPetróleo informed the headquarters of Agip Brazil that the Regional Cuiabá of Agip Distribuidora was billing fuel for customers classified as large consumers (lower price), but, in reality, they were delivering them at gas stations. As this operation could only be carried out with the knowledge of the Regional Commercial Manager who was on vacation, the Commercial Director and the Internal Audit Manager promptly went to the city of Cuiabá to talk to the Sales Coordinator, Mr. Douglas, privately.

In the visit and in the contacts with Mr. Douglas, these executives felt from Mr. Douglas a dubious, non-collaborative position, because if on one hand he reported that there were problems at GRV-Cuiabá, on the other hand, he didn't specify clearly and objectively. It was requested from Mr. Douglas an absolute confidentiality about this meeting that had even taken place outside the company.

It turns out that Regional Sales Manager, upon returning from his vacation, was immediately informed by Mr. Douglas that the Commercial Director and the General Manager of Internal Audit were in Cuiabá to inquire about problems in the management at GRV-Cuiabá, which naturally generated discomfort and embarrassment. This characterized a breach of trust by Mr. Douglas. When asked about this procedure, Mr. Douglas didn't know how to give a satisfactory explanation and began to blackmail by threatening that he would send denunciations to ENI, in Italy, to show that the management of Agip Brazil was not taking any steps to remedy irregularities. His unfounded accusation and unbalanced posture only confirmed the breach of trust, and there was, in fact, no reason for him to continue on the company's staff, which is why he was fired.

As the investigation of the facts by the Headquarters continued, the undue procedures reported by the president of SindiPetróleo were actually confirmed. Therefore, in August 2001, there was also the dismissal of the Regional Sales Manager and two Business Advisors from GRV-Cuiabá”.


There is not the slightest doubt that this pseudo version of my dismissal, presented by the executives I had denounced, including members of the direction of AGIP Brazil, had been sent to the headquarters of Eni (Italy) in that year of 2002.

However, AGIP Brazil's arguments about the “circumstances” of my dismissal were not enough to convince the Board of Directors of Eni. And that's because, if the directors of Eni had accepted and agreed with the “narrative” of the Brazilian subsidiary, the matter would have died and been buried forever. However, shortly after, Eni, taking advantage of my complaint, began the investigations and the necessary measures on the very serious facts that occurred at AGIP Brazil described by me to the Board of Directors and to the top executives of Eni.

This affirmation is so true that, just over thirty days after Eni received the memorandum from AGIP Brazil with the “circumstances” of my dismissal, a Eni’s “big boss” landed in Brazil on November 12, 2002, the CEO of AGIP Petroli (Italy), Mr. Angelo Mario Taraborelli, the immediate superior of the CEO of the Eni's Brazilian subsidiary.

This illustrious visit was reported by the magazine “Agip in Action” (Doc. 19), a publication sent to all AGIP service stations installed in Brazil.

A few weeks later, in December 2002, an avalanche of layoffs began at AGIP Brazil of all those involved in the fraud I had reported to Eni, including middle and top management executives and even the director of the commercial area, who was fired in June 2003, before Eni's Brazilian assets were sold to Petrobras.

It is irrefutable in this post the fact that, the "untrue, defamatory, and libelous contentof this memorandum with the "circumstances" of my dismissal — contrary to the facts (and proofs) presented in this post and, repeatedly to Eni throughout these two decades — was replicated and shared by Eni when the company presented the 2nd version (2010) and the 3rd version (AGM 2017) about my dismissal.

I also need to underline something very important. These new documents were the last four pieces that were missing to completely assemble the puzzle of my story with Eni. And so, all the reprehensible and unjustifiable acts of AGIP Brazil could be visualized, as well as the questionable attitudesmisconceptions, and errors of Eni to my disfavor and contrary, not only to the corporate commitments assumed by Eni — including in its Code of Ethics, which states that the company will protect whistleblowers — but especially to the international commitments accepted and followed by Eni.

And it was this complete puzzle that motivated me to write to the NCP Brazil again, in July 2020, and the most relevant point of this new complaint was exactly the new attack on my honor and reputation promoted by Eni during the AGM 2017, as well as the new documents” I had received from the successor to Eni’s Brazilian assets, that were sufficiently capable of further proving my allegations against Eni.

Note that, since it was indisputably proved in this post, I was the victim of my own whistleblowing because both Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and Eni itself took all the “bonuses” of my complaints, and, throughout all these for years, I have been bearing all the "burdens" for having had the "ethical courage" to comply with the words and the spirit of Eni's "Code of Ethics", resulting, evidently, in countless damages and immeasurable losses to my disadvantage.

However, I am fully aware that the certainty of having done what is right does not guarantee any reward, but it does guarantee peace. And there is no greater reward than the peace of having done what is right, despite the fact that during these two decades I have been trying tirelessly and unceasingly, and with every legal instrument at my disposal, to rescue and restore my name, my honor, and my reputation that have been unjustly denigrated by Eni.

Furthermore, only the truth can be proven because it's not possible to prove liesAnd this is the reason for Eni, during these two decades of "ethical clash", to be distorting and manipulating the truth of the facts without presenting proofs of its narratives instrumentally conceived in my disfavor.

And, what is even more serious, Eni is disregarding its own commitments and also the international commitments accepted and followed by the company by refusing to carry out a “due diligence” on my case in the light of the “chronology of the facts” (Doc. 20), which was sufficiently capable of “reconstructing the events” about the “actions” and “omissions” of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and of Eni itself to my disadvantage.


Tuesday, May 10, 2022

Eni & OPL 245: The Bribe of the Century

 


"The final triumph of truth & consistency over falsehood, fraud, mega corruption & persecution. The fabricated cyberstalking charge was struck out today. 

Thanks for the supports: Global Witness, Heda Resource Centre, ReCommon, Osiwa and MacArthur Foundation".

by Olanrewaju Suraju


Saturday, April 09, 2022

Eni: reprisals, victimization and bad faith


In this MEMORIAL describes my story with the Italian oil giant since 2001, when I was unfairly fired — after denouncing a million-dollar “scheme” of fraud and acts of corruption, in compliance with the company’s Code of Ethics — going through the systemic imposition of “reprisals” and the strategy of “victimization” instrumentally engineered until the withdrawal of the “good offices” — offered by NCP Brazil, due to non-compliance with the “OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” — in march 2022.

The facts described (and the documents, incorporated in dozens of web links), are full proof that ENI is not only responsible for unjustly denigrating my name, my honor, and my reputation during all these years, but it is also responsible for destroying my professional career and taking my retirement out of my hands. As if that were not enough, ENI is not fulfilling the commitments assumed to its Stakeholders through its own policies and codes, declarations, norms, and procedures, as well as the international pacts, conventions, principles, and guidelines accepted and followed by ENI, including, the Italian government, the company's controlling shareholder, who appears in many of these international commitments, as an adherent, signatory or ratifying party, including United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

In these more than 20 years, ENI has never carried out a “due diligence” on my case in light of the commitments mentioned here, even though it had asked me for a “proposal for amicable settlement” — in November 2020, through the Italian Ambassador in Brazil — and never having responded to this proposal, not even after being questioned by a critical shareholder during the company's Shareholders' Meeting, held in Rome, in May 2021.

In this document mentioned here, you will know my expectations, not only regarding ENI itself, but also regarding international institutions and other Stakeholders, including the Italian government, the company's controlling shareholder. And that's because, even with the best practices, a company can cause or contribute to causing negative and harmful consequences that it did not foresee or was unable to avoid.

Wednesday, March 30, 2022

Eni & OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises


Even with the various non-conformities of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ENI gave up the "good offices" offered by NCP Brazil.

In my case, the Italian oil giant continues to fail to comply with its own commitments (codes and policies, declarations, norms and procedures) as well as international commitments accepted and followed by the company.

My fight will continue!